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ABSTRACT 
TWO ESSAYS ON CUSTOMER-SUPPLIER NETWORK AND TRADE SECRETS 
by 
Yi Liu 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2019 
Under the Supervision of Professor Valeriy Sibilkov 
This dissertation investigates two important topics: idiosyncratic shock 
aggregation in customer-supplier network and impacts of trade secret litigations on stock 
performance. The first essay studies the underlying factors for stock returns comovement 
between customer and supplier firm. The investigation further explores the idiosyncratic 
shocks propagation and aggregation in the network. The second essay documents the 
stock market reactions to trade secret lawsuit outcomes and its economic meanings to the 
industry. 
The first essay, Idiosyncratic Shocks Aggregation in Customer-Supplier Network, 
is inspired by Acemoglu, et al. (2012)’s theoretical work and Cohen and Frazzini 
(2008)’s empirical study. Traditional theory regarding idiosyncratic shocks suggest 
diversification effect averages out microeconomic shocks within each sector of an 
interconnected network. However, more and more recent study shows that idiosyncratic 
shocks may translate into aggregate shocks if the interconnected system is asymmetric. 
Empirical research in customer-supplier network shows that the stock returns of a 
customer and a supplier firms comove strongly. Idiosyncratic information and earnings 
news are the key drivers of the stock return comovement induced by the establishment of 
the customer-supplier relationship. By studying the return connections between customer 
and supplier firms, I find idiosyncratic shocks propagate and aggregate in this network. A 
new risk factor formed by aggregating idiosyncratic returns of customer firms is 
evidently priced in suppliers’ returns. This study builds on existing customer-supplier 
network research and contribute to the literature by pinpointing the information channels 
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and contents that drive stock return comovement and document a new risk factor in 
customer-supplier network. 
The second essay, Economic Outcomes of Corporate Espionage, uses a unique 
hand collected trade secret lawsuit dataset, and documents strong stock market reactions 
to trade secret lawsuit outcomes. Trade secret lawsuit data including file date, plaintiffs 
and defendants, and court rulings are manually collected from Lexis-Nexis database and 
carefully screened to determine the directions of court rulings. The empirical results 
indicate stock market reacts to court outcomes not only at firm level, but also at industry 
level. Further regression and difference-in-differences analysis suggest strong intellectual 
properties protection system encourages firms’ R&D investment and future growth 
opportunities. 
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Abstract 
Using customer-supplier networks, we document a strong increase in stock return 
comovement between customer and supplier after the establishment of their relationship. This 
increase in comovement is mainly associated with cash flow news and firm-specific information. 
The idiosyncratic shocks to customers diffuse through the customer-supplier network and 
aggregate into a systematic risk, which affects suppliers’ expected returns. Using a long-short 
portfolio based on exposure to aggregated customer risk, we realize an annual excess return of 
3.1% (value-weighted) and 6.11% (equal-weighted), respectively. The customer risk factor 
cannot be explained by market, size, book-to-market or momentum factor. 
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Introduction 
On Jan, 3rd 2019, Apple stock tumbled 8.99% in a single day, triggered by a public letter 
released from Cupertino, California warning lower revenue guidance for the first quarter of 
2019. On the same day, the S&P 500 index dropped 1.52%, and Nasdaq closed 1.86% lower. 
Although Apple was the second largest corporation by market valuation, it did not seem to 
justify the vast evaporation of the total US market value because the amount disappeared is 
similar to the total market capitalization of Apple. But if we consider the large number of 
companies connected to Apple, the impact on Apple can be amplified through its connected 
economic networks and the shocks to its suppliers accumulate in massive market fluctuations. As 
in this anecdotal case, it is possible that market-wide shock could originate from an individual 
company if it is linked to many firms through economic networks. 
A large strand of literature in asset pricing have attempted to understand how individual 
shocks aggregate into market-wide fluctuation. Granular network theory offers a micro-
foundation: the aggregation of individual risk becomes a risk at the market-level. Gabaix (2011) 
and Acemoglu et al. (2012) provide theoretical frameworks that idiosyncratic shocks will 
aggregate into systematic shocks in the granular network. More evidence is accumulated in 
recent empirical studies. Kelly, Lustig, and Nieuwerburgh (2013) show that consistent to 
granular network theory, firm size distribution is a key determinant of firm-level volatility and 
volatility comovement in the network. Ahern (2013) explores the industry network and finds that 
industries placed more central in the network exhibit higher risks and returns. These papers only 
show less direct implications which would hold at the equilibrium level.  
In this paper, we fill this gap by studying the propagation of firm-specific shocks through 
customer-supplier networks and how firm-specific shocks become a systematic risk. Motivated 
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by both theoretical groundwork and the availability of data, we comprehensively investigate the 
channels of idiosyncratic shocks propagation and the pricing of these shocks in customer-
supplier links.  Specifically, when firms are connected to other firms along the supply chain, 
stock returns of these linked firms become more comoving. As a customer is more connected, 
the shocks to these customers are propagated throughout the connections. The aggregation of 
idiosyncratic shocks to these customers is a systematic risk factor which does not overlap with 
existing risk factors. Thus, suppliers with greater exposure to this customer risk factor have 
higher stock returns.  
The customer-supplier relationship is an integral part of companies. For customer firms, 
supply chain management is an important part of operations and critical to the success of the 
company. In accordance with their importance, not only does the information pass through this 
channel, but also the shocks spread to the connected companies. We use the customer-supplier 
relationship of individual firms as the backbone of granular networks. As a filing requirement, 
suppliers must declare their principal customers who account for more than 10% of their total 
sales. We identify these customers for each supplier and construct the complete network using 
each identified customer-supplier pair. Our sample records a sizable turnover in customer-
supplier relationships. Over the thirty-five years sample period, we document over 18,000 
customer-supplier pairs consists of 6,492 suppliers and 2,902 customers. More than half of the 
relationships last for less than two years. The average duration of links is 6.3 years.  
We first examine the stock return comovement between customer and supplier firms. 
Customer-supplier link (hereafter, CSL) return comovement has been documented in several 
studies (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008 and Cen, Hertzel, and Schiller, 2017). Contrast to the lead-lag 
comovement recorded in the previous studies, we document strong contemporaneous return 
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comovement between customers and suppliers using our up-to-date CSL sample. We show that 
the return comovement between two firms increases significantly since the establishment of 
CSL.  
To confirm that the baseline results are not biased, we match each supplier firm 
(customer firm) with a pseudo-customer (supplier) within the same industry and the same size 
quintile. The randomly matched pairs have no economic links to each other. However, we still 
detect a significant degree of return comovement between these pseudo pairs because a 
substantial amount of CSLs is formed in the same industry, or between related industries. The 
customer and supplier firms exhibit strong stock prices correlation due to the similarity in their 
core business and the business cycle.  The essential difference is that the return comovement of 
pseudo pairs does not increase at all during the pseudo linked period, suggesting that increases in 
return comovement come from the information propagation within the customer-supplier 
relationship. 
We then examine which component of stock returns contributes to increment in return 
comovement. We decompose customer’s returns into cash flow news and discount rate news 
using a method proposed by Chen, Da, and Zhao (2013, CDZ hereafter).  Using decomposed 
quarterly return data,1 we find that cash flow news mainly contributes to the increase in 
comovement, not the discount rate news, especially between the firms who have maintained a 
long-term relationship. When changing customers’ cash flow expectations, investors revise the 
cash flow expectations of linked suppliers. 
We corroborate the comovement in cash flow expectation by examining comovement in 
earnings surprises, as earnings surprise contains information about the cash flow of the company. 
                                                          
1 Although conservative, quarter return decomposition is much more reliable and trustworthy than monthly return 
decomposition because analyst earnings forecasts are disclosed on a quarterly basis. 
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Forecasting errors obtained from seasonal random-walk models and cumulative post-
announcement abnormal returns are used as measures of earnings surprises. We find that the 
comovement in earnings surprises only exists when CSL is formed, which confirms the vital role 
of the cash flow channel in a customer-supplier relationship. The comoving earnings surprises 
suggest that the cash flow channel transmits not only market information, but also firm-specific 
operating uncertainty because firm-specific information is embedded in earnings news. 
According to the literature on return comovement, there could be two possible causes of 
return comovement. First, comovement results from the alignment of firms’ fundamentals. For 
instance, a customer or supplier firm may be forced to share its profits with its business partner if 
the partner firm possesses bargaining power. The findings of the synchronous revision in the 
cash flow expectations for customers and suppliers support this argument. Second, return 
comovement can be driven by investors’ behaviors (Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler, 2005; 
Pirinsky and Wang, 2006). Investors of these stocks can follow similar investment patterns and 
moves the price of these stocks in the same direction.  
A detailed investigation of customer and supplier firms’ fundamentals comovement and 
the underlying determinants of their return comovement is necessary for us to understand the 
nature of the phenomenon. We find that profitability measures such as profit margin and return 
on assets comove alongside the return comovement. It confirms that return comovement comes 
from aligning firms’ fundamentals. Next, we examine the determinants of return comovements. 
Sales concentration is a major driver for return comovement. A supplier with more concentration 
shows a greater return comovement for the customer.  We also find that comovement becomes 
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stronger if the customer’s size is larger. Trade credits, link duration, and common institutional 
ownership all leads to the greater comovements.2 
Next, we raise the question whether the increment in comovement comes from the 
increased correlation of firm-specific risk or increased exposure on systematic risk factors. The 
evidence so far indicates that an increase in return comovement for a customer-supplier 
relationship is due to idiosyncratic information. Firm-specific risks are predominantly 
transmitted to connected companies, but a change in systematic risk exposure can be followed 
when the link is established. For example, suppliers can increase relation-specific investment, 
which leads to higher exposure to market beta. Our further investigation employs the Fama-
French three-factor model in addition to industry returns and decomposes customer and supplier 
firms’ monthly returns into idiosyncratic and systematic components. The result shows that most 
of the changes in return comovement are caused by firm-specific risk propagation.  
From granular network theory, the idiosyncratic risks of individual firms will aggregate 
into the systematic risk in an asymmetric network. On the other hand, from the canonical risk 
factor models, idiosyncratic risks should be diversified away and do not have a risk premium. 
We empirically examine whether aggregated firm-specific risks are priced. Particularly, we 
aggregate idiosyncratic shocks to customers which have many suppliers. These customers are 
located more central in the granular network and their firm-specific shocks are more easily 
propagated and impact other companies, and thus become systematic. We first estimate the 
                                                          
2  Interestingly, we find the difference in bargaining power between customer and supplier firms reduces the 
comovement, supported by the effect of ROE and leverage on comovements. Higher ROE of customers or suppliers 
would imply that they have more bargaining power and do not share their profits with opposite party. Higher 
leverage is a well-known proxy for bargaining power. If the firms do not share their profits with connected firms, 
their fundamentals would less comove, resulting in lower return comovement. 
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supplier firms’ exposure to aggregate customer risks. It shows that supplier’s exposure to 
customer risk is directly related to the complexity of its connections to customers. The more 
customers a supplier has, the higher its risk exposure, which proves that idiosyncratic shocks do 
aggregate through the network.  
To analyze the risk-return relationship of customer risks, we adopt Fama-Macbeth 
regressions and show that the risk premium of aggregate customer risk is significantly positive. 
Suppliers’ returns increase monotonically with the beta of aggregate customers’ idiosyncratic 
returns. Put it differently, suppliers with greater exposure to aggregate customer risks are 
perceived as riskier and their stock returns are higher. In turn, we show that firm-specific risks of 
customers with many suppliers become systematic risks and have a positive risk premium. As a 
falsification test, we aggregate the idiosyncratic return of customers with less than three 
suppliers, which is less likely to become systematic in the granular network. Consistently, the 
risk premium of the pseudo-risk factor does not exist. 
We construct the long-short portfolio of suppliers sorted by quintiles on the basis of 
customer betas. We rebalance the portfolio monthly by buying the supplier stock with the highest 
customer betas and shorting the supplier firms with the lowest customer betas. The portfolio 
generates annual excess returns of 3.1% (value-weighted) and 6.11% (equal-weighted), 
respectively, suggesting that aggregate customer risk cannot be explained by Fama-French three 
factors or momentum factor.  
The first contribution of this paper is to stock return comovement literature. Existing 
theories suggest return comovement can be driven either by the alignment in firms fundamentals 
or by investors’ behaviors. Recent evidence is more favorable to the latter explanation. For 
example, comovement in commodity prices is best explained by investors’ herding behavior 
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(Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1988). Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) also show that 
comovement among S&P 500 index firms is driven not by fundamental but by friction or 
sentiment.3 Our paper links comovement to information channel and risk propagation in a 
business network. Return comovement between linked firms appears to be the result of the 
fundamental adjustment of both firms.  
This paper also contributes to the traditional portfolio theory. Idiosyncratic shocks 
through an economic network aggregate into systematic shocks. Consistent with Ahern (2013), 
in a business network, the centrality of the firm is directly linked to its exposure to aggregate 
risk. The excess returns generated by the long-short portfolio in this paper show that investors 
view centrality as greater exposure to systematic risk. 
Our paper is most closely related to the literature studying the customer-supplier return 
comovement. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) construct a customer momentum investment strategy 
designed to exploit investors’ inattention to this subtle yet valuable information network. 
Although the excess returns from such a strategy have diminished in the past decade in a general 
way, they still exist among customer-supplier relationships where information diffuses slowly 
(Cen, Hertzel, and Schiller, 2017), or if information of the companies is costly to obtain 
(Veldkamp, 2006). With an extended CSL dataset and solid theoretical supports, we dissect and 
analyze the customer-supplier linkage more in-depth and reveal the specific shock propagation, 
the channels it is passing through, and eventually the pricing of aggregated idiosyncratic shock. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and tablets the 
summary statistics. Section III presents the baseline results. Section IV investigates the 
                                                          
3 Stocks with similar price levels also comove due to category restriction (Green and Hwang, 2009). Local investors’ 
investment pattern (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006), analyst coverage (Hameed, Morck, Shen, and Yeung, 2015; Guan, 
Wong, and Zhang, 2015), and joint institutional ownership (Anton and Polk, 2014) each play a critical role in return 
comovement. 
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information flow through the cash flow channel. Section V delves into the fundamental drivers 
of return comovement. Section VI prices customer firm’s idiosyncratic return. Section VII 
concludes the paper. 
Data 
Firm’s disclosure about segments of an enterprise and related information, also known as 
FASB statement No. 131, requires the company to report customers accounting for more than 
10% of its total annual sales. We extract customer segments data from Compustat, and our 
customer-supplier link (CSL) dataset covers the period from 1980 to 2015.4 Some customer 
names are either presented as abbreviations of the company names or artificially ambiguous due 
to reporting firms’ convenient record keeping. We use computer programs to generate a series of 
potential matched customers for each equivocal customer name. We then manually identify the 
real match by cross-referencing using various sources including but not limited to 
CRSP/Compustat database, company’s official website, Bloomberg company files, and 
Hoover’s. We are purposely stringent on the matches, and we only keep those without any 
ambiguity.  Our analysis focuses on the common stocks on NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX. We 
drop firms with stock prices lower than $5 to avoid the impact from the microstructure. Utility 
firms and financial institutions are also excluded. For each firm in our final sample, we retrieve 
its return data from CRSP and firm characteristics from the Compustat database.  
Table I summarize the CSL data set. The full sample contains 18,088 unique customer-
supplier links, across the 35 years. The number of suppliers is more than the double of the 
number of customers, which is expected given the average size of customers is ten times as large 
as that of suppliers. Customer firms are also more connected than supplier firms. Customer firms 
                                                          
4 We expand the CSL samples of Cohen and Frazzini (2008) by extending sample period to 2015 and matching 
customers more accurately. 
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have an average of 6.2 suppliers, comparing to only 2.6 customers per supplier. The most 
connected customer firm in our sample is Walmart. The company has reported a total of 450 
suppliers over a span of 35 years. The most connected supplier, Highwoods Properties Inc., on 
the other hand, has only reported 36 customers in the same period. In 2976 pairs, linked firms 
(customer and supplier) come from the same industry. We use Fama-French 48 industries 
classifications. 
Link duration is among the key variables in our primary analysis. Mean duration is 6.3 
years, and the most enduring link is almost as extensive as the whole sample period. One fact  to 
note is that the distribution of the link durations is right-skewed. More than 50% of the links 
(9873 to be exact) last for less than two years, while the long-term links (duration longer than 
five years) account for more than 25% of the full sample. Our empirical evidence in the main 
analysis supports the prediction that a long-term supplier-customer relationship affects a firm’s 
characteristics and operations more substantially and persistently than a short-term one.  
Our baseline comovement tests use weekly returns ending on Wednesdays. We believe 
that weekly returns are more suitable for our study than daily or monthly returns for two reasons: 
first, it avoids nonsynchronous trading consequences associated with daily stock returns; second, 
weekly returns offer more observations comparing to monthly returns. It is critical in our panel 
regression because more than half of our final sample consists of customer-supplier links that last 
for less than two years and thus have short time-series. It is imperative to preserve as many 
observations as possible before and after the CSL announcement to maintain a balanced panel 
dataset. 
One of the primary interests of this paper is to reveal the information channels that 
connect customer and supplier firms. In general, financial information channels can be classified 
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into two categories: cash flow news and discount rate news.  We use implied cost of capital 
(ICC) approach proposed by Chen, Da, and Zhao (2013, CDZ hereafter) to decompose the 
returns. Extreme values are inevitable by-product of CDZ’s return decomposition methodology 
because they use direct cash flow forecasts by analysts which contain substatial noise. We 
winsorize cash flow news and discount rate news to 5 and 95 percentiles to minimize the side 
effect. In table I, we see that the distribution of discount rate news is much more dispersed than 
that of cash flow news. It is not surprising since the cash flow news in CDZ’s decomposition is 
simply the analysts’ earnings forecast and discount rate news has to absorb all other information.  
The cross-sectional statistics of our customer-supplier link sample (panel C of table I) 
allow us to evaluate the complexity of the network. The majority of the firms report only 1 or 2 
customers every year. It is expected because firms are only required to report their principal 
customers. More than 50% of the customer-supplier links last no more than two years in the 
sample based on the firm's report. Long-term links, which last longer than five years by our 
definition, account for a little over 10% of the full sample. Although this does not seem like 
much, the long-term links are the mainstay of our study because the comovement investigation 
requires a substantial length in the time-series dimension.  
Customer-Supplier Comovement and the Information Channels 
Our core analysis estimates the following regression: 
𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  𝛽௖𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ +  𝛾௟௜௡௞𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘௜,௧ +  𝛽௅஼𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ +  𝛽ெ௄்𝑀𝐾𝑇௜,௧ + 𝛽ூே஽𝐼𝑁𝐷௜,௧ +  𝜖௜,௧   (1) 
SRET is a supplier firm’s stock return over the estimation period. CRET is a 
corresponding customer’s stock returns. Link is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
two firms have been reported as customer and supplier at the time of observation (linked period), 
and 0 otherwise (unlinked period). MKT is value-weighted market returns, and IND is the 
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supplier’s corresponding industry’s value-weighted returns. Both indices exclude corresponding 
supplier firms. We follow Fama and French (1992) industry classification to form 48 industry 
portfolios. We select value-weighted market and industry indices in response to the massive firm 
size differences between supplier and customer firms. In an unreported robustness check, we 
replace the value-weighted index with equal-weighted ones. All the results stay highly 
consistent, and all the references remain unchanged. 
We analyze information channel directly using customer-supplier pairs instead of 
aggregating suppliers’ news for a customer or customers’ news for a supplier because more than 
50% of the customer-supplier links are short-lived. If we form a customer portfolio for a supplier 
firm, the underlying companies within the portfolio change drastically from one report date to 
the next, resulting in disorganized and unbalanced customer portfolio. Also, constructing a 
customer portfolio is useless for a large number of suppliers with only one customer. Moreover, 
customer portfolio formation artificially creates observation gaps5.  
Table II presents the baseline results of this paper. The return regressions use weekly 
returns. In our robustness check, We use monthly returns to rerun all the return comovement 
tests. All results stay highly consistent, and no changes in the inferences are spotted. Link 
duration varies across the final sample links. To both fit our regression model with a balanced 
panel dataset, we analyze the comovement using subsets with different link durations. The 
different duration subsets allow us to examine the impact of link duration on the comovements. 
We test the return comovement in three subsets: CSLs with minimum link duration of two, three, 
                                                          
5 E.g., firm A reported one customer, firm B, in 1980, and another customer, firm C, in 1985. Our study considered 
them as two independent links. However, firm A’s customer portfolio, in this case, doesn’t offer economic meanings, 
nor helps reveal the information channels. 
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and five years.6 We maintain a balanced panel dataset for all three subsets. For example, the 
unlinked period for the five-year subset is (t-84, t-24) months and the linked period is (t, t+60) 
months from the cutoff point. The cutoff point is the earliest date when a CSL is reported. The 
two-year gap in between unlinked and linked period is to address the concern that a customer-
supplier relationship exists before it is acknowledged by the public because companies are only 
required to report their principal customers who contribute to at least 10% of their sales. 
The return comovement factors of customer-supplier relationship can be classified into 
three categories. First, market (systematic) influences such as GDP growth, inflation, 
employment rate, and economic healthiness affect all stocks. Although these factors move stock 
prices in a general way, their impact is lower than those of industries. The second category, 
industry impact, accommodates much richer information including but not limited to the 
proximity of operations and core business among firms, industrial growth opportunities, intra-
industry information flow and networking, and industry oriented institutional investing. The final 
category is customer-supplier link specific information, which is also the primary interest of this 
paper, consists of the closeness of a link, link duration, common institutional ownership, and 
firm characteristics. 
The empirical evidence supports our claims. Panel A of Table II shows the industry’s 
influence on stock returns is not only eight times as large as the market’s, but much more 
significant. It is critical for us to control both market and industry interference to highlight the 
designated information channels that transmit news along the supply chain. 
Even after controlling for market and industry returns, we still cannot claim the 
comovement between customer and supplier firms is directly driven by such a relationship. We 
                                                          
6 The subsets are not mutually exclusive. The subset with three-year link duration are always a part of subset with 
two-year link duration. 
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want to discover the information channels specifically associated with the customer-supplier 
relationship. Customer and supplier firms’ returns may covary before their relationship begins 
due to the proximity in their core business and main operations. Only the differences in 
comovement between the linked and unlinked period give us the insight of channels that host 
link-specific information. Information never stops flowing between firms, especially if two 
companies are within the same industry. Twenty-five percent of our customer-supplier pairs 
come from the same industry, and more come from related industries. Market and industry 
influences are unlikely to change suddenly due to an announcement of the customer-supplier link 
because such a message is firm-specific information, not systematic. If additional comovement is 
detected following the disclosure, it is mainly related to this economic link. And the associated 
information channel is exclusive to the customer-supplier relationship. 
Our panel regression model is very similar to those used in the difference-in-differences 
analysis. The core difference is that we only have one dummy variable. We are interested in the 
comovement purely induced by customer-supplier link information and the information channel 
through which this information passes. 
The baseline results reveal that return comovement between supplier and customer firms 
are highly significant across the sample. For every 1% increase in customer firm’s return, the 
supplier’s return increases about 0.08% even when they are not linked. After the public has 
acknowledged the relationship, the comovement increases by approximately 20%.  Apparently, 
there is an information channel connecting supplier and customer firms. Panel A shows that a 
substantial portion of the return comovement between supplier and customer firms in our sample 
is driven by various market and industry factors, and some unobservable factors. The 
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comovement exists prior to the customer-supplier relationship, but the link increases 
comovement to a significantly higher level. 
Undeniably, there is more than one way to categorize information channels. However, the 
building block of financial valuation models relies on two elements: cash flow and discount rate. 
Recent studies have been debating the importance of cash flow news relative to discount rate 
news in stock prices movement (Goyal and Welch 2008; Larrain and Yogo 2008; Chen, Da, and 
Priestley 2012). Coincidentally, researchers are discussing the effects of investor’s behavior 
comparing to firms’ fundamentals when explaining return comovement.  
Building upon the intuitions and insights of existing literature, the total comovement 
between supplier and customer should be driven by both cash flow and discount rate news. 
However, it is unclear what is driving the increase in comovement induced by the establishment 
of the customer-supplier link. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) show customer portfolio’s return can 
predict corresponding supplier’s return for up to a month because of investor’s inattention to this 
important economic links. Nonetheless, investor’s attention is supposed to eliminate the 
information lag, instead of driving the comovement increase. A more plausible explanation is 
that the boost in the comovement is driven by the cash flow news of customer and supplier firms. 
No rational investment patterns, nor diversification needs will urge investors to buy or sell both 
customer and supplier firms simultaneously.  
To further investigate, we use a return decomposition approach proposed by Chen, Da, 
and Zhao (CDZ) (2013) and decompose customer’s returns into cash flow news and discount 
rates news. The approach extracts prevailing analyst earnings forecasts from IBES as direct 
measures of a firm’s expected future cash flows, to back out the implied cost of capital (ICC). 
The CDZ return decomposition singles out the cash flow news and allow us to explicitly 
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examine the relationship between firms’ fundamentals and the increase in CSL return 
comovement. In panel B and C of Table II, we test the comovement between the supplier’s 
returns and these two components of the customer’s return: 
𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  𝛽௖𝐶_𝐶𝐹௜,௧ +  𝛾௟௜௡௞𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘௜,௧ +  𝛽௅஼𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝐶_𝐶𝐹௜,௧ +  𝛽ெ௄்𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐹௜,௧ + 𝛽ூே஽𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐶𝐹௜,௧  +  𝜖௜,௧   (2) 
𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  𝛽௖𝐶_𝐷𝑅௜,௧ +  𝛾௟௜௡௞𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘௜,௧ +  𝛽௅஼𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝐶_𝐷𝑅௜,௧ +  𝛽ெ௄்𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐷𝑅௜,௧ + 𝛽ூே஽𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐷𝑅௜,௧  +  𝜖௜,௧  (3) 
  C_CF is a customer’s cash flow news, and C_DR is a customer’s discount rate news. 
MKT_CF/MKT_DR is the market-wide value weighted cash flow news/discount rate news, and 
IND_CF/IND_DR is the industry value-weighted cash flow news/discount rate news. We find 
customer’s discount rate news affect supplier’s returns across the whole sample. However, we do 
not detect any change in comovement after two firms become business partners or the link is 
known to the public. It suggests that the increases in comovement we document in Panel A are 
not driven by the information related to the discount rate. CSL changes both firms’ fundamentals 
and investor’s expectations of the future cash flows. A successful long-term customer-supplier 
relationship reduces the volatility in supplier’s cash flows and the business risk of both sides, 
resulting in stronger comovement due to the cash flow news, and such a claim is solidly 
supported by empirical evidence. In this sense, the return comovement through the customer-
supplier link is distinguished from the comovement among S&P500 firms (Barberis, Shleifer, 
and Wurgler, 2005) or geographically close firms (Pirinsky and Wang, 2006). 
Panel B and C of Table II definitely point out, for all CSLs that last longer than five 
years, the increase in comovement from CSL establishment is solely driven by customer’s cash 
flow news. The information channel that connects supplier and customer firms always exists, 
even before they cooperate. The business partnership leads to additional cash flow news passage 
between the participating companies. Such cash flow news could contain information about 
18 
 
mutual extra earnings or savings in the business operations, or comovement in some other 
fundamental variables. It takes an abiding partnership to allow this implicit cash flow news to 
aggregate to a level where it is powerful enough to align stock returns. Our results shed light on 
the empirical return comovement researches where scholars tend to find the importance of 
investor’s behaviors dominates that of the firm’s fundamentals. 
The insight of (CDZ, 2013) is that cash flow news is more important than discount rate 
news if accumulated over a long investment horizon. Discount rate news is rather transitory. 
Over time, its return driving power will deteriorate and eventually be outweighed by cash flow 
news, which is fundamentals related. The baseline return decomposition is revised quarterly 
based on analyst earnings forecasts. Nevertheless, the model can be altered to estimate monthly 
cash flow news and discount rate news. As a robustness check, we rerun panel B and pane C in 
Table II using monthly CDZ decomposition. Although the significance of some results 
decreases, the overall implications of the results are the same. 
Previously we claim that market and industry factors drive a significant portion of return 
comovement between supplier and customer stocks. Also, we state the economic connection 
after CSL establishment primarily induces the increase in comovement. To validate these 
propositions, we test the return comovement among pseudo-customer-supplier pairs. For each 
customer (supplier) firm in the sample, we randomly identify a matched company within the 
same stock exchange, the same size quintile classified by NYSE common stock breakpoints, and 
the same industry categorized by Fama-French 48 industry classification. When identifying the 
matches, we make sure each matched pair has never had a real economic connection.  
Table III estimate the following model: 
𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  𝛽௖𝑃𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ +  𝛾௟௜௡௞𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘௜,௧ +  𝛽௅஼𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ +  𝛽ெ௄்𝑀𝐾𝑇௜,௧ + 𝛽ூே஽𝐼𝑁𝐷௜,௧ +  𝜖௜,௧      (4) 
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𝑃𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  𝛽௖𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ +  𝛾௟௜௡௞𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘௜,௧ +  𝛽௅஼𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ +  𝛽ெ௄்𝑀𝐾𝑇௧ + 𝛽ூே஽𝐼𝑁𝐷௝,௧ +  𝜖௜,௧       (5) 
PCRET (PSRET) is the return of a pseudo-customer (pseudo-supplier) over the linked 
and unlinked period. The tests in Table III are identical to those conducted in Table II. In 
addition to stock returns comovement analysis, we decompose customer and pseudo customer’s 
returns into cash flow news and discount rate news and run the model (2) and (3) for the pseudo 
pairs we form. 
The coefficients of PCRET and CRET in Table III suggest a strong correlation in stock 
returns between these pseudo pairs even if there are no real business connections. Since the 
pseudo-customer and pseudo-supplier are selected from the same stock exchange and the same 
industry, we can safely assume market and industry factors are driving the comovement in these 
pseudo pairs. More importantly, we do not observe any increase in comovement in any analysis 
or any subset during the linked period. Cash flow and discount rate component analysis suggest 
the same inferences.  
Comovement and Idiosyncratic Information 
The baseline result indicates that cash flow channel is vital to the customer-supplier 
relationship. However, it remains to consider what information is transmitted through this 
channel and leads to greater return comovement. Although the a customer-supplier relationship 
makes the firms to engage in relation-specific investments, which generates more synchronous 
cash flows between these firms, we cannot rule out the possibility that increased exposure to the 
systematic risks may induce a greater comovement. To further investigate the channnel, we 
decompose both customer and supplier’s returns into idiosyncratic and systematic components. 
Table IV tests the comovement of both idiosyncratic and systematic monthly returns of 
linked firms. Idiosyncratic and systematic returns are estimated using regression model (6).  
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𝑅௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  𝛽ெ௄்𝑀𝐾𝑇௜,௧ +  𝛽ௌெ஻𝑆𝑀𝐵௜,௧ +  𝛽ுெ௅𝐻𝑀𝐿௜,௧ +  𝛽ூே஽𝐼𝑁𝐷௜,௧ + 𝜀௜,௧ (6) 
We use Fama-French three factors and industry returns to decompose the firm’s excess 
returns. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting the U.S. T-bill rates from stock returns. 
Monthly factors and risk-free rate data are retrieved from WRDS. We also add industry value-
weighted return to the regression to control the substantial industry influence on customer-
supplier return comovement. We calculate the industry value-weighted return of each firm and 
the corresponding firm is excluded . We employ 60-month rolling windows, i.e. (t-59, t) months, 
to estimate the coefficients of the four independent variables. Then we predict the stock return in 
the month (t+1 month) following estimation window using the estimated coefficients as well as 
Fama-French three factors (MKT, SMB, HML) and industry value-weighted return in (t+1) 
month. The predicted return is the systematic component, and the prediction error is the 
idiosyncratic return. This return decomposition method relies on regression predictability. To 
make sure the robustness of the results, we also decompose the return using daily returns. We 
verify the idiosyncratic and systematic return comovement using these daily decomposed return, 
and all the results remain the same. 
The regressions in Table IV resemble the tests in Table II and III. The differences are, in 
Table IV, the dependent variable is the supplier’s idiosyncratic/systematic return. The 
independent variable CRET represents the customer’s idiosyncratic/systematic return. Link is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if two firms have been reported as customer and 
supplier at the time of observation (linked period), and 0 otherwise (unlinked period). MKT is 
market-wide value-weighted idiosyncratic/systematic return, and IND is industry-wide indices.  
Table IV unambiguously indicates that CSL-induced return comovement is determined 
by the firm-specific information flow between the linked customer-suppler firms. For the CSLs 
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longer than three years, the comovement in idiosyncratic returns becomes double during the 
linked period. The idiosyncratic return comovement increases almost triple for the subset of 
CSLs with 8 year link duration. We find strong comovement between supplier and customer’s 
systematic returns, but, the systematic comovement in the linked period does not differ from that 
in the unliked period. 
The results imply that supplier and customer firm’s idiosyncratic returns are more 
correlated after the start of their cooperation. There is no increase in exposure to common 
systematic risks induced from the formation of the customer-supplier link. The investors are 
sophisticated enough to incorporate the idiosyncratic information of customers into the stock 
prices of suppliers of the CSL. The low r-squares in the regression for idiosyncratic return 
comovement should not be surprising because idiosyncratic shock are orthogonal to systematic 
ones and technically needs to be orthogonal to idiosyncratic shock of the other company. It is 
important to note that these idiosyncratic shocks to customers and suppliers may not be from the 
separate correlated events. The key is that, if there is an unique event to either customer and 
supplier, the shock of one company is transferred to other company and moves their stock price 
in the same direction. 
The importance of idiosyncratic return for the stock return dynamics draw a lot of 
researchers’ attention since Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) documented the up-trend 
in firm-level idiosyncratic volatility in the recent decades. Numerous attempts have been made to 
explain the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. Some find a negative relationship between expected 
stock returns and idiosyncratic volatility (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang 2006 & 2009; 
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan 2015). The others argue that there is no significant relationship 
between expected stock returns and idiosyncratic volatility (Bali and Cakici, 2008; Guo, Kassa, 
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and Ferguson 2014).7 These firm-specific returns and volatility is closely related to earnings 
information (Jiang, Xu, and Yao 2009; Zhang, 2010). Following the existing evidence, earnings 
surprises would contain more idiosyncratic cash flow news than discount rate news. . 
In Table V, we examine comovement between long-term supplier and customer’s 
earnings surprises using four different measures of earnings surprises. The first two measures, 
RET5 and RET21, are 5 trading day and 21 trading day post-earnings announcement cumlative 
abnormal returns (CAR). The CARs of supplier and customer are calculated from the customer’s 
earnings announcement date in each reporting quarter if the annoucement dates of the linked 
firms are different.  We also utilize standardized unexpected earnings (SUE1), which is 
calculated based on a rolling seasonal random walk model (Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006) 
and  standardized unexpected earnings  accounting for the exclusion of special items (SUE2). 
We  do not use earnings surprises from analysts’ forecasts because they can follow Non-GAAP 
standards, and carry a different form of mispricing (Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006), which is not 
desired in this study. The analysts' subjectivities can introduce additional noise to earnings 
surprises. Our study focuses on the movements in firms’ stock returns, along with operations and 
fundamentals.  
Table V shows significant increases in the comovement between customer’s and 
supplier’s 5-day CAR (RET5) and 21-day CAR (RET21) across all three subsamples. The 
increases in return comovement are not surprising given our baseline results, but the magnitude 
of the increases is noteworthy. The increases in comovement are more prominent during the 
event periods than normal times. There is no significant correlation between the customer and 
supplier’s 5-day cumulative returns (RET5), when an economic linkhas not been established. 
                                                          
7 Fu (2009) exceptionally documents a positive relationship between expected stock returns and idiosyncratic 
volatility. 
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Although the 21-day cumulative returns (RET21) of customer and supplier comove before the 
linked period, the comovement becomes almost triple during the linked period.  It appears that 
the 21-day cumulative returns include the effects from  industry factors as it shows relatively 
stronger correlations between RET21 and industry returns. The earnings news of customer firms 
has a ripple effect to their suppliers’ earnings surprises. 
Standardized unexpected earnings (SUE1 and SUE2) offer more direct examination for 
the comovement of earnings shocks in the firm operations. Derived from a seasonal random walk 
model, SUE1 and SUE2 are supposed to be randomly distributed. However, in 2-year and 3-year 
link duration subsample, we find almost same degree of comovement in earnings surprises 
before and after the CSLs establishment. For the 5-year link duration subsample, we observe  the 
increases in earnings surprises comovement. 
As a next, we investigate whether the increases in comovement of stock return and 
earnings surprises are associated with changes in firms’ fundamentals.The long-term customer-
supplier relationship is different from a short-term one when we consider the relationship as 
intangible asset of the firm. In particular, committed long-term customers are valueless assets of 
the suppliers because business risks can be reduced and shared by these customers. Cooperation 
does not necessarily align customer and supplier’s revenue, but it can also save business 
networking costs and improve the quality of the profits on both sides. On the other hand, the 
relationship can be more entranched if the relationship becomes longer. We predict that 
alignment in fundamentals would be more apparent in longer duration CSLs. 
In Table VI, we analyze the comovement in two fundamental variables: profit margin and 
return on assets (ROA). Similar to equation (1), we replace returns with profit margin and ROA 
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of both dependent (supplier’s) and independent variables (customer’s). We control the market 
and industry value-weighted profit margin and ROA.  
𝑆_𝑃𝑀௜,௧ = 𝛼 +  𝛽௖𝐶_𝑃𝑀௜,௧ +  𝛾௟௜௡௞𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘௜,௧ +  𝛽௅஼𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝐶_𝑃𝑀௜,௧ +  𝛽ெ௄்𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝑃𝑀௧ +  𝛽ூே஽𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑃𝑀௝,௧ +  𝜖௜,௧  (7) 
𝑆_𝑅𝑂𝐴௜,௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽௖𝐶_𝑅𝑂𝐴௜,௧ + 𝛾௟௜௡௞𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘௜,௧ + 𝛽௅஼𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝐶_𝑅𝑂𝐴௜,௧ +  𝛽ெ௄்𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝑅𝑂𝐴௧ + 𝛽ூே஽𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝑅𝑂𝐴௝,௧ +  𝜖௜,௧ (8) 
Quarterly and annual fundamental data are retrieved from Compustat. Profit margin is 
defined as the firm’s net income divided by revenue. ROA is defined as the total of income 
before extraordinary items, interests, and related expenses scaled by total assets. Annual data is 
more reliable due to the seasonality in accounting variables. Table VI shows that customer and 
supplier firms have no correlations in the fundamentals when economic links are not formed. 
After their relationship begins, their profit margins and return on assets become to comove 
strongly. Profit margins and return on assets are not only the snapshots of a firm’s operation but 
also the indicator of the healthiness of the firm’s financials. The comoving fundamentals of 
customer and supplier firms affirms the existence of the cash flow channel between customer and 
supplier firms.  
Cross-Sectional Determinants of Customer-supplier Return Comovement 
In this subsection, we examine the determinants of return comovement between customer 
and supplier. We regress supplier’s weekly returns on customer’s weekly returns directly during 
the linked period and obtain the betas (β). In the second stage regression, we regresses the betas 
from first stage on a collection of industry, firm, and link characteristics:  
I. Industrial comovement, the comovement between supplier’s and customer’s 
corresponding industries value-weighted returns. 
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II. Common institutional ownership, a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
a customer-supplier pair has at least one common institutional investor, and 0 
otherwise.  
III. Link duration, the natural log of link duration in months. 
IV. Sales concentration, CSL sales divided by supplier/customer’s revenue. 
V. Accounts payable, the ratio of accounts payable to revenue 
VI. Accounts receivable, the ration of accounts receivable to revenue 
VII. Size, the natural log of the firm’s market capitalization. 
VIII. Leverage, firm’s total debt scaled by total assets.  
IX. Market to book ratio, defined as (total assets + market value of common equity – 
book value of common equity) / Total assets.  
X. ROE, return on equity (net income over equity).  
XI. Size difference, the ratio of the supplier firm’s market capitalization to customer 
firm’s. 
All firm characteristics are from Compustat quarterly file, and institutional ownership 
data is from CDA/Spectrum. Firm characteristic variables are averaged over the linked period 
and year fixed effect is applied to the cross-sectional regressions. The revenue, total assets, and 
common equity which are used forscaling other variables are from the previous fiscal year-end.  
In Table VII, we again confirm that a substantial portion of CSL return comovement 
results from the comovement in industry returns. The evidence among long-term links appears to 
be strong. Interestingly, common institutional ownership has an explanatory power for the 
comovement. However, its ability becomes weaker when we control for supplier’s firm size. The 
institutional investors are sophisticated investors, who make the market more efficient. Their 
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trades make the information of one party of CSL incorporated into the stock price of the other 
party.  But for the large supplier, there is less private information left for institutional investors to 
exploit, hence the common ownership contribute little to the comovement. However, the 
institutional investors play an essential role in the return comovement between small supplier 
and customer. 
Link duration is a unique variable in CSL comovement study. Influences from some 
determinants such as investors’ behavior are transitory, while others associated with fundamental 
changes are more permanent. In an unreported subsample analysis, we find the effect of link 
duration on return comovement is discontinuous. The return comovement is much stronger 
among long-term links than short-term links.  
The first three determinants arerelation specific variables. The rest of the determinants 
are charicteristics of customers and suppliers. Sales concentration measures the closeness of a 
customer-supplier relationship. From the supplier’s point of view, the transactions are revenues, 
but they are costs for customers. Our empirical results indicate that customer purchase 
concentration is the most dominant driver of the comovement, while supplier sales concentration 
is not significant in most tests. Given the asymmetric nature of customer-supplier network, that 
size of customer is much larger than size of supplier and customers have more number of CSL 
than suppliers, customers have more bargaining power than suppliers. When customers can not 
replace their supplier with another supplier, they have less bargaining power and must share their 
profits, which leads to more comovement in fundamentals. In unreported results, we find the 
average supplier sales concentration is around 12%, while the average customer sales 
concentration is only 0.56%. In a customer-supplier relationship, customers are more likely to 
take control.  
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Trade credit is valuable information to companies in the supply chain. It tightens the 
relationship between  customer and supplier by linking some of their financial obligations. We 
find customer’s accounts payable and supplier’s account receivable are important determinants 
of return comovement. Customer’s accounts payable is more critical for short-term links, and 
supplier’s accounts receivable are essencial to CSLs of any duration.  
Leverage, particularly customer’s leverage, provides interesting insights. Leverage 
represents business risk and financing costs of the company. In table VII, we find that significant 
coefficient of the supplier’s leverage disappears when the size of the supplier is controlled. 
However, customer’s leverage is negatively associated with return comovement.  We argue that 
the leverage of customers allows them to have greater bargaining power against suppliers, but 
that of suppliers has less effect, because suppliers are more easily replaced by another and thus 
threatening channels do not work. 
In summary, CSL return comovement is greater if the customer and supplier firms are 
more closely related in terms of their businesses. The proximity of their industries, common 
institutional ownership, and smaller size differences make them more closely associated. They 
become more connected to each other if they cooperate for a long-run with substantial sales.  
The Aggregation of Idiosyncratic Shocks Through Customer-Supplier Links 
Research on idiosyncratic information has received little attention because of the 
diversification argument. Nevertheless, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001)’s discovery of 
trending aggregated idiosyncratic volatility in recent decades spotlights the topics and numerous 
following studies have related the anomaly to various causes (Wei and Zhang 2006, Irvine and 
Pontiff, 2008, Fink et al. 2009), and delivered different asset pricing implications (Ang, Hodrick, 
Xing, and Zhang, 2006 and 2009, Han and Lesmond, 2011, Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012). 
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These papers show that idiosyncratic shocks not only play a critical role in valuating 
corporations which are connected in complex ways, but also affect investors’ expectations of 
firms’ risk. 
Both theoretical works (Gabaix, 2011, Acemoglu et al., 2012, Kelly, Lustig, and 
Nieuwerburgh, 2013) and previous empirical results unambiguously suggest the aggregation of 
idiosyncratic shocks into systematic shock in the customer-supplier network. First of all, 
customer-supplier network is an asymmetric network. Customers do not hold a business with all 
their suppliers for the same amount.. Moreover, customers on average are much larger and more 
powerful than the suppliers, and some customers or suppliers have more businesses with many 
other firms. Second, our comovement study reveals rich information flows through the links, 
including earnings news, operating information, and other firm-specific information. These 
information flows align firms’ fundamentals and drive stock return comovement. Idiosycratic 
shocks to customers should aggregate and become a substantial force that drive the stock prices 
of their suppliers. 
Given the structure of the customer-supplier network, we aim to test if aggregated 
customers’ idiosyncratic shocks are priced in suppliers’ returns. We employ Fama and Macbeth 
two-stage regressions. Customer’s idiosyncratic returns are residual in the regression model (6). 
We include  market, size, book-to-market factors, and value-weighted industry return.We 
aggregate customers idiosyncratic returns by averaging idiosyncratic returns of all customers that 
have more than three suppliers and generate the customer factor.We first relate the network 
centrality of the supplier firms and their exposure on customer factor as Ahern (2013) show the 
importance of centrality in inter-industry network for explaining industry returns.  Note that we 
rule out the industry effects on customer factors by including industry return in the first stage 
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regression to get idiosyncratic return. We first use the number of customers as a proxy for a 
supplier’s network centrality(additional test on the alternative centrality measure is presented in 
the appendix). We obtain beta of customer factor from the regression of suppliers’ returns on 
customer factor, as well as Fama and French three factors. We then sort companies into six 
groups by the number of customers of each supplier: suppliers with 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and more than 5 
customers, respectively. Equal-weighted and value-weighted customer betas are calculated for 
each group. 
In Table VIII, we observe that customer betas increase monotonically as the connections 
of a supplier increase. For suppliers’ with only one customer, the value-weighted customer beta 
is indistinguishable from zero, although the equal-weighted customer beta is statistically 
significant. When a supplier is in the peripheral of the network, their exposure to aggregated 
idiosyncratic shock to the customers  will be minimal. When a supplier firm is placed more in the 
center of the customer-supplier network, the correlation between its returns and the customer 
factor increases extensively. Consistently, for suppliers with more than one customer, both 
equal-weighted and value-weighted averages of customer betas are highly significant. For 
suppliers with more than 5 customers, every 1% increase in customer factor will lead to more 
than 1% increases in their stock returns. The results are consistent with the graunalar network 
theory. If the firm-specific shocks to customers are not aggregated into systematic shocks rather 
diversified away, we would not find any exposure of supplier’s return to customer factor. 
Moreover, the pattern that the beta of customer factor increases as the number of supplier’s 
connection would only be observed in the graunalar network. For suppliers with multiple 
customers, the customer idiosyncratic shocks do aggregate instead of being diversified. 
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Table IX reports the second stage of Fama-MacBeth regression results. First, we regress 
suppliers’ returns on value-weighted market returns and customer factor and obtain market betas 
and customer betas using 36-month rolling windows. Next, we run Fama-MacBeth regression of 
suppliers’ returns on customer beta, market beta, as well as four supplier firms’ characteristics 
variables: logged market capitalizations (log(size)), book to market ratio (BM), lagged monthly 
returns (lag(ret)), and lagged annual returns (lag(ret_1year)), in the month immediately after the 
36-month rolling window. We use these firm characteristic variables to control for size, book-to-
market, short-term reversal, and momentum effect. Column 1 shows that the coefficient of beta 
of customer factors is significantly positive. When suppliers are more exposed to customer 
factors, the return on supplier stocks are significantly higher.  One standard deviation increase in 
beta of customer factor would result in 0.51% increase for average return of supplier. The result 
implies that aggregate customer risk is not hedgeable to investors and requires a positive risk 
premium.  
In falsification tests (columns 2 and 3), we replace customer factor with aggregated 
peripheral customers idiosyncratic returns and aggregated market idiosyncratic returns, and find 
no evidence of pricing. We define peripheral customers as those customer firms with less than 
three suppliers. Both peripheral customers’ Idiosyncratic returns and market Idiosyncratic returns 
are equal-weighted factors. Not all idiosyncratic returns are  aggregated into systematic risks. 
Non-aggregated idiosyncratic shocks through the customer-supplier network are not priced. The 
falsification tests once again confirms the shock aggregation through the customer-supplier 
network. They prove that our results are not driven by the sample biases. In column 4, we 
include betas for customer factor,  peripheral customer factor, and market Idiosyncratic returns at 
the same time, but only customer factor appears to be priced in the market. In our robustness 
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check, we rerun table IX by using beta of SMB, HML, and UMD as control variables instead of 
firm characteristics. The results are highly consistent with those reported.  
In the appendix, we exmaine the asset pricing implication of network centrality measure. 
The beta of customer factor is a direct measure of exposure to customer risks for suppliers.  
However, we can proxy the exposure using the summary statsitic from the structure of the 
network. We use network centrality concepts to capture the exposure on customer risk. As in 
Ahern (2013), we use eigenvector centrality of the supplier firms.8 Eigenvector centrality is 
defined as the first eigenvector of the customer-supplier network’s adjacency matrix.9 Centrality 
is not significantly positive, but  its magnitude is  still economically strong and positive as the 
theory predicts. Because of the large amount of noise in the customer-supplier network at firm-
level data, the centrality measure cannot capture tightly the exposure to customer risk. In 
addition to Fama-MacBeth regression results, we construct a long-short portfolio based on beta 
of customer factor. We sort suppliers into quintiles according to their customer betas. Quintile 1 
includes the suppliers with the lowest customer betas, while quintile 5 consists of those with 
highest customer betas. For the long-short portfolio, we buy suppliers with the highest customer 
betas and sell suppliers with the lowest customer betas simultaneously at the beginning of each 
month. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly. If we ignore transaction costs and taxes, the long-
short portfolio generates annualized equal-weighted alpha of 3.1% and value-weighted alpha of 
6.11%, respectively. Our result is more robust for the large suppliers than small suppliers. It is 
                                                          
8 Our customer-supplier network is massive and asymmetric. Eigenvector centrality accounts for the importance of 
a node (firm) for the connectivity in the whole network. 
9 We make the customer-supplier network adjacency matrix using sales number between each firm pair and make 
the undirectional matrix. For robustness check, we also form an adjacency matrix using dummies to indicate the 
connections: 1 if two firms are connected and 0 if not. The results from the two methodologies are identical. 
32 
 
less subject to issues on market-microstructures. It shows that investors do get rewarded by 
bearing customer risk and the return difference is quite sizable.   
Conclusion 
We scrutinize stock return comovement in customer-supplier relationship.  CSL return 
comovement results from various factors: market influence, industry factors, and investor’s 
attention. The establishment of a customer-supplier relationship amplifies the existing 
comovement between the two firms. The increase in comovement is primarily due to the cash 
flow information transmitting between the linked firms. Consistent with the efficient market 
hypothesis, at least for the long-term customer-supplier relationship, fudamental changes in both 
firms drives increase in comovement rather than investor’s behavior.. Abiding and committed 
customer-supplier relationships align both firms’ fundamentals. 
Interestingly, return comovement in CSL comes from idiosyncratic information, instead 
of the systematic information. Unlike diversification argument, idiosyncratic shocks are 
propagated through the CSL and stay within the network.  The connections and network among 
firms  provide the channel for idiosyncratic shocks to transmit and the power for them to 
aggregate. The aggregated idiosyncratic shocks eventually become part of the systematic risk of 
the firms in the network. 
The excess returns generated from the long-short portfolio we constructed cannot be 
explained by Fama and French three factors or momentum factor. It shows that idiosyncratic 
shocks to the central customers are not diversified away, but are aggregated into the systematic 
risks. Our result complies with efficient market hypothesis as the customer risk are priced in the 
market. The risk premium is quite substantial, cannot be ignored when we use any portfolio 
strategy. Our work provides a important insight of return comovement in the connected firms 
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within the input-output network, and contributes to understanding of the rise of the systematic 
risk.  
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Table I 
CSL Dataset and CDZ Decompositions Summary Statistics 
This table shows the summary statistics of our customer-supplier links (CSL) collection. The dataset includes all the principal customers reported by 
supplier firms. The sample comprises of common stocks listed at NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. Utility firms and financial institutions are excluded 
as well as ADRs. We also exclude micro stocks whose prices are lower than $5. The sample period spans from 1980 to 2015. Quarterly return 
decomposition uses the approach proposed by Chen, Da, and Zhao (CDZ, 2013). The model use analyst earnings forecasts as direct measures of 
expected cash flows (CF) to backs out the discount rate (DR) estimates. Both CF news and DR news are winsorized to 5 and 95 percentiles.  
 
Panel A: Link Summary 
Number of suppliers   6492   
Number of customers   2902   
Number of links   18088   
Number of links in the same industry   2976   
Panel B: Link and CDZ Decompositions Statistics 
  MIN MAX MEAN MEDIAN STD 
Number of suppliers per year 389 1215 978.3 1029 175.7 
Number of customers per year 344 1069 828.0 920 186.5 
Number of links per year 617 2514 1801.8 1949 497.3 
Number of links in the same industry per year 42 394 254.0 288 101.6 
Link durations (years) 1 34 6.3 5 5.2 
Number of customers per supplier 1 36 2.6 2 2.4 
Number of suppliers per customer 1 450 6.2 1 18.8 
Customer size (in millions, USD) 5.81 724773.40 37106.19 10336.55 67148.99 
Supplier size (in millions, USD) 2.44 275006.06 2330.90 285.03 11093.95 
Customer returns (weekly, %) -83.76 130.70 0.89 0.56 5.29 
Supplier returns (weekly, %) -61.17 91.67 1.21 0.55 7.27 
Returns (Excluding Dividends) -96.85% 315.46% 2.32% 2.03% 18.29% 
CF News -42.78% 45.03% 1.01% 0.66% 18.29% 
DR News -119.99% 358.24% 1.20% 0.52% 24.25% 
Panel C: CSL's Cross-Sectional Statistics 
Number of suppliers per customer per year 1 2 3 4 5 
Count 10424 2875 1484 945 654 
Percentage 57.63% 15.89% 8.20% 5.22% 3.62% 
Number of customers per supplier per year 1 2 3 4 5 
Count 10160 4271 1986 645 252 
Percentage 56.17% 23.61% 10.98% 3.57% 1.39% 
Link Duration 1-year 2-year 3-year 5-year 8-year 
Count 6832 3314 2175 990 371 
Percentage 37.77% 18.32% 12.02% 5.47% 2.05% 
Link Duration >=1 year >=2 year >=3 year >=4 year >=5 year 
Count 18088 11229 7890 4260 1985 
Percentage 100.00% 62.08% 43.62% 23.55% 10.97% 
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Table II 
Pair-wise Changes in Co-movement of Supplier and Customer 
We estimate the following model: 
𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ =  𝛼 +  𝛽௖𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ + 𝛾௟௜௡௞𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘௜,௧ + 𝛽௅஼𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ +  𝛽ெ௄்𝑀𝐾𝑇௧ + 𝛽ூே஽𝐼𝑁𝐷௝,௧ +  𝜖௜,௧ 
The dependent variable SRETi,t is returns of suppliers. CRETi,t is a corresponding customer’s weekly returns. Linki,t is dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if two firms are linked as customer 
and supplier at the time of observation, and 0 otherwise. We impose a two-year gap between linked and unlinked period. Link*CRETi,t is the interaction term. We estimate a balanced panel model for 
each link duration subset. E.g., for all links last longer than 2 years, (t-208, t-104) weeks is the unlinked period while (t, t+104) weeks is the linked period. MKTt is the value-weighted weekly market 
returns and INDj,t is value weighted weekly returns of supplier’s corresponding industry, defined by Fama and French 48 industry classification. Both indices exclude the corresponding supplier firm. 
This sample comprises of common stocks listed at NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX, with prices no less than $5. Utility firms, financial institutions, and ADRs are excluded. Sample period spans from 
1980 to 2015. T-stats are presented in parentheses and are adjusted by industry clustered standard errors. CF news and DR news are decomposed quarterly returns of customer firms. Quarterly return 
decomposition uses the approach proposed by Chen, Da, and Zhao (CDZ, 2013). Both CF news and DR news are winsorized to 5 and 95 percentiles. 
 
Changes in Comovement 
CRET Panel A: Returns  Panel B: CF News  Panel C: DR News 
Link Duration 2-year 3-year 5-year  2-year 3-year 5-year  2-year 3-year 5-year 
CRET 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.080***  0.064*** 0.048*** 0.007  0.061** 0.066** 0.090*** 
 (9.22) (8.86) (6.80)  (4.26) (3.36) (0.58)  (2.46) (2.64) (5.04) 
Link -0.000** -0.000 -0.000**  -0.008 -0.004 -0.011*  -0.019** -0.016** -0.015** 
 (-2.42) (-1.40) (-2.06)  (-1.61) (-0.87) (-1.72)  (-2.31) (-2.37) (-2.24) 
Link_CRET 0.022*** 0.018** 0.021**  -0.020 -0.004 0.046***  0.000 -0.021 -0.028 
 (2.93) (2.18) (2.18)  (-1.31) (-0.21) (3.29)  (0.00) (-0.80) (-1.39) 
MKT 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.133***  -0.034 -0.032 -0.080  0.285*** 0.275*** 0.269*** 
 (3.13) (2.90) (3.29)  (-0.54) (-0.52) (-1.15)  (5.23) (5.23) (5.27) 
IND 0.908*** 0.894*** 0.868***  -0.157** -0.150** -0.137**  0.533*** 0.517*** 0.503*** 
 (21.22) (20.37) (20.24)  (-2.47) (-2.40) (-2.15)  (13.07) (13.03) (12.47) 
Constant -0.000 -0.000** -0.000  0.059*** 0.055*** 0.062***  0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
 (-1.56) (-2.29) (-1.30)  (9.76) (8.69) (8.39)  (4.06) (4.95) (5.06) 
            
Observations 679,572 773,304 752,984  76,863 72,360 59,257  76,863 72,360 59,257 
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.180 0.183  0.004 0.004 0.005  0.164 0.161 0.169 
Industry Clustered Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
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Table III 
Pair-wise Changes in Co-movement of Real Supplier (Pseudo Supplier) and Pseudo Customer (Real Customer) 
We estimate the following model: 
Panel A: 𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ =  𝛼 + 𝛽௖𝑃𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ + 𝛾௟௜௡௞𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘௜,௧ +  𝛽௅஼𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝑃𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ + 𝛽ெ௄்𝑀𝐾𝑇௧ + 𝛽ூே஽𝐼𝑁𝐷௝,௧ + 𝜖௜,௧ 
Panel B: 𝑃𝑆𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ =  𝛼 + 𝛽௖𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ + 𝛾௟௜௡௞𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘௜,௧ + 𝛽௅஼𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝑇௜,௧ + 𝛽ெ௄்𝑀𝐾𝑇௧ + 𝛽ூே஽𝐼𝑁𝐷௝,௧ + 𝜖௜,௧ 
For each customer (supplier) firm in the CSL dataset, we randomly identify a matched firm within the same stock exchange, the same size quintile categorized by NYSE common stock breakpoints, and the same industry 
defined by Fama and French 48 industry classification. The dependent variable SRETi,t is returns of suppliers. PCRETi,t is a corresponding pseudo customer’s weekly returns. CRETi,t is a customer’s returns. PSRETi,t is a 
corresponding pseudo supplier’s weekly returns. Linki,t is dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if two firms are linked as real customer and supplier at the time of observation, and 0 otherwise. We impose a two-year 
gap between linked and unlinked period. We estimate a balanced panel model for each link duration subset. E.g., for all links last longer than 2 years, (t-208, t-104) weeks is the unlinked period while (t, 
t+104) weeks is the linked period.  MKTt is the value-weighted weekly market returns and INDj,t is value weighted weekly returns of supplier’s corresponding industry, defined by Fama and French 48 industry 
classification. Both indices exclude the corresponding supplier firm. This sample comprises of common stocks listed at NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX, with prices no less than $5. Utility firms, 
financial institutions, and ADRs are excluded. Sample period spans from 1980 to 2015. T-stats are presented in parentheses and are adjusted by industry clustered standard errors. CF news and DR 
news are decomposed quarterly returns of customer firms. Quarterly return decomposition uses the approach proposed by Chen, Da, and Zhao (CDZ, 2013). Both CF news and DR news are 
winsorized to 5 and 95 percentiles. 
Psuedo Customer 
CRET Returns (Weekly)  CF News (Quarterly)  DR News (Quarterly) 
Link Duration 2-year 3-year 5-year  2-year 3-year 5-year  2-year 3-year 5-year 
CRET 0.067*** 0.058*** 0.064***  0.026 0.054** 0.017  0.044** 0.044** 0.042** 
 (9.39) (5.36) (7.50)  (1.23) (2.61) (0.55)  (2.64) (2.56) (2.64) 
Link -0.000* -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.005 0.004 -0.011**  -0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (-1.97) (-4.29) (-3.02)  (-1.32) (0.87) (-2.16)  (-0.93) (0.63) (0.26) 
Link_CRET -0.011 -0.009 -0.013*  0.017 -0.013 0.032  -0.028 -0.016 -0.019 
 (-1.68) (-0.87) (-1.76)  (0.53) (-0.46) (1.04)  (-1.39) (-1.27) (-1.29) 
MKT 0.173*** 0.180*** 0.175***  -0.041 0.003 -0.049  0.203*** 0.197*** 0.215*** 
 (6.83) (5.60) (5.33)  (-0.58) (0.05) (-0.70)  (4.50) (4.29) (4.42) 
IND 0.755*** 0.774*** 0.743***  -0.146*** -0.178*** -0.171***  0.450*** 0.448*** 0.438*** 
 (20.83) (20.87) (22.39)  (-2.76) (-3.52) (-2.95)  (10.30) (8.59) (9.45) 
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.054*** 0.044*** 0.060***  0.037*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 
 (0.47) (0.15) (1.53)  (11.45) (8.58) (9.86)  (8.70) (10.84) (5.88) 
            
Observations 403,896 449,759 453,336  35,107 31,220 26,705  35,669 32,156 26,403 
Adjusted R2 0.162 0.172 0.164  0.004 0.005 0.006  0.145 0.147 0.148 
Industry Clustered Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
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Psuedo Supplier 
CRET Returns (Weekly)  CF News (Quarterly)  DR News (Quarterly) 
Link Duration 2-year 3-year 5-year  2-year 3-year 5-year  2-year 3-year 5-year 
CRET 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.050***  0.045** 0.066** 0.050**  0.004 -0.002 0.011 
 (5.81) (5.18) (5.10)  (2.50) (2.61) (2.23)  (0.26) (-0.11) (0.52) 
Link -0.001** -0.000 -0.001***  0.001 -0.004 -0.012**  0.001 -0.001 -0.008* 
 (-2.24) (-0.47) (-3.04)  (0.14) (-0.74) (-2.26)  (0.36) (-0.14) (-1.72) 
Link_CRET -0.011 0.002 0.004  0.004 -0.027 -0.008  -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 
 (-1.26) (0.38) (0.47)  (0.24) (-1.12) (-0.33)  (-0.62) (-0.51) (-0.57) 
MKT 0.197*** 0.177*** 0.195***  0.049 0.082 0.041  0.145*** 0.137*** 0.143*** 
 (5.65) (5.58) (6.74)  (0.62) (0.89) (0.41)  (4.14) (3.76) (4.82) 
IND 0.810*** 0.800*** 0.774***  -0.169*** -0.176*** -0.166***  0.491*** 0.539*** 0.510*** 
 (17.53) (19.86) (23.20)  (-2.87) (-3.19) (-2.80)  (13.57) (14.60) (13.40) 
Constant -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000  0.044*** 0.048*** 0.056***  0.030*** 0.032*** 0.039*** 
 (-1.52) (-3.53) (-0.67)  (8.62) (8.17) (9.50)  (9.46) (8.37) (8.89) 
            
Observations 318,968 373,543 406,323  34,094 30,780 27,058  32,234 29,938 26,194 
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.178 0.174  0.005 0.004 0.004  0.156 0.172 0.156 
Industry Clustered Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
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Table IV 
 Idiosyncratic and Systematic Returns Comovement 
We decompose both customer and supplier’s monthly excess returns into idiosyncratic and systematic components using Fama and French three-factor model, plus controlling for value weighted 
industry returns. Excess returns are calculated by subtracting the U.S. T-bill rate. Our model uses the 60-month rolling window to regress a firm’s monthly returns on the Fama and French three 
factors (MKTRF, HML, and SMB) as well as its corresponding industry’s value-weighted returns to predict its next month’s return. The predicted return is the systematic return and the prediction 
error is the idiosyncratic return. The dependent variable is supplier’s idiosyncratic/systematic return, and CRET is customer’s idiosyncratic/systematic return. Link is a dummy variable which takes 
the value of 1 if two firms are linked as real customer and supplier at the time of observation, and 0 otherwise. We estimate a balanced panel model for each link duration subset. E.g., for all links last 
longer than 2 years, (t-48, t-24) months is the unlinked period while (t, t+24) months is the linked period.  MKT is the value-weighted market idiosyncratic/systematic returns and IND is value 
weighted idiosyncratic/systematic returns of supplier’s corresponding industry, defined by Fama and French 48 industry classification. Both indices exclude the corresponding supplier firm. This 
sample comprises of common stocks listed at NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX, with prices no less than $5. Utility firms, financial institutions, and ADRs are excluded. Sample period spans from 1980 
to 2015. T-stats are presented in parentheses and are adjusted by industry clustered standard errors. 
 
Idiosyncratic and Systematic Returns Comovement 
CRET IdioRet  SysRet 
Link Duration 2-year 3-year 5-year  2-year 3-year 5-year 
CRET 0.058*** 0.038*** 0.039***  0.138*** 0.134*** 0.118*** 
 (3.30) (2.71) (3.36)  (4.20) (4.40) (3.59) 
Link -0.001 -0.000 -0.001  0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (-0.43) (-0.24) (-0.77)  (1.07) (0.68) (1.28) 
Link_CRET 0.008 0.038*** 0.031***  -0.001 -0.009 0.015 
 (0.48) (3.11) (3.22)  (-0.07) (-0.52) (1.13) 
MKT 1.196*** 1.275*** 1.225***  0.465*** 0.449*** 0.416*** 
 (4.95) (5.61) (6.41)  (4.88) (5.17) (5.29) 
IND 0.018 0.029 0.145*  0.621*** 0.625*** 0.631*** 
 (0.19) (0.32) (1.69)  (9.09) (10.53) (11.49) 
Constant -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005***  0.002** 0.002** 0.001** 
 (-4.01) (-4.98) (-4.84)  (2.53) (2.55) (2.49) 
        
Observations 125,033 148,621 160,917  125,033 148,621 160,917 
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.004 0.004  0.486 0.491 0.507 
Industry Clustered Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
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Table V  
Comovement in Earnings Surprises 
This table presents the comovement between supplier and customer firm’s earnings surprises. We use four earnings surprises measurement: Ret5 and Ret21 respectively are post-earnings 
announcement 5-day and 21-day returns. We match supplier’s earnings announcement date to its customer’s in each reporting quarter. Sue1 is earnings surprises measured using a rolling seasonal 
random walk model (Livnat and Mendenhall, 2006). Sue2 is Sue1 accounting for the exclusion of special items. The dependent variable is supplier’s earnings surprises, the ES is customer’s earnings 
surprises. Link is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if two firms are linked as real customer and supplier at the time of observation, and 0 otherwise. We estimate a balanced panel model for each link 
duration subset. E.g., for all links last longer than 5 years, (t-84, t-24) months is the unlinked period while (t, t+60) months is the linked period.  MKT is the value-weighted market earnings surprises and 
IND is value weighted earnings surprises of supplier’s corresponding industry, defined by Fama and French 48 industry classification. Both indices exclude the corresponding supplier firm. This sample comprises of 
common stocks listed at NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX, with prices no less than $5. Utility firms, financial institutions, and ADRs are excluded. Sample period spans from 1980 to 2015. T-stats are 
presented in parentheses and are adjusted by industry clustered standard errors. 
ES Measure Ret5   Ret21   Sue1   Sue2 
  2-year 3-year 5-year  2-year 3-year 5-year  2-year 3-year 5-year  2-year 3-year 5-year 
ES 0.016 -0.012 -0.001  0.071** 0.056** 0.083***  0.080*** 0.058** 0.020  0.090*** 0.068*** 0.031* 
 (0.42) (-0.42) (-0.04)  (2.52) (2.67) (4.54)  (3.72) (2.46) (1.02)  (4.36) (3.15) (1.95) 
Link -0.003 -0.005** -0.002  -0.004 -0.009*** -0.003  -0.002 -0.002 -0.003***  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002*** 
 (-1.22) (-2.45) (-0.83)  (-1.58) (-3.15) (-0.98)  (-1.33) (-1.37) (-3.27)  (-1.13) (-1.33) (-2.86) 
Link_ES 0.051 0.091** 0.109***  0.137*** 0.143*** 0.106***  -0.042 -0.009 0.061***  -0.047** -0.021 0.049** 
 (1.10) (2.57) (3.29)  (3.05) (3.61) (2.90)  (-1.57) (-0.40) (3.44)  (-2.21) (-1.02) (2.35) 
MKT_ES 0.813*** 0.639*** 0.690***  0.354*** 0.328*** 0.356**  0.680*** 0.594** 0.614***  0.418* 0.431** 0.418** 
 (3.27) (2.81) (3.40)  (3.47) (2.75) (2.39)  (2.88) (2.53) (2.95)  (1.98) (2.20) (2.56) 
IND_ES 0.660*** 0.644*** 0.531***  0.839*** 0.789*** 0.652***  0.730*** 0.714*** 0.671***  0.762*** 0.740*** 0.696*** 
 (4.47) (4.67) (4.72)  (9.92) (7.95) (4.91)  (6.58) (6.10) (7.71)  (6.53) (6.74) (10.84) 
Constant 0.003 0.004* 0.004  -0.001 0.001 0.001  0.000 0.000 0.001  0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (1.18) (1.87) (1.49)  (-0.36) (0.41) (0.31)  (0.12) (0.06) (1.43)  (0.15) (0.11) (1.37) 
Observations 47,908 48,578 42,319  47,833 48,508 42,270  55,528 56,875 49,910  55,615 56,970 49,984 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.042 0.041  0.199 0.183 0.161  0.036 0.035 0.039  0.035 0.036 0.040 
Industry Clustered Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
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Table VI 
Comovement in Fundamentals 
We estimate the comovement in profit margin (PM) and return on total assets (ROA). PM is net income scaled by firm’s revenue. ROA is the total of 
income before extraordinary items and interests and related expenses divided by lagged total assets. Fundamentals date comes from Compustat’s 
annual update database. We regress suppliers’ fundamental variables on customers’. C_Var is a corresponding customer’s PM and ROA. Link i,t is 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if two firms are linked at the time of observation, and 0 otherwise. We estimate a balanced panel model 
for each link duration subset. E.g., for all links last longer than 5 years, (t-84, t-24) months is the unlinked period while (t, t+60) months is the linked 
period. MKT_Var is the value-weighted quarterly marketwide PM and ROA, and IND_Var is value weighted annual PM and ROA of supplier’s 
corresponding industry, defined by Fama and French 48 industry classification. This sample comprises of common stocks listed at NYSE, NASDAQ, 
and AMEX, with annual sales no less than $10 million. Utility firms, financial institutions, and ADRs are excluded. Sample period spans from 1980 
to 2015. T-stats are presented in parentheses and are adjusted by industry clustered standard errors. 
 
 
Comovement in Fundamentals 
  2-year   3-year   5-year 
Var PM ROA   PM ROA   PM ROA 
C_Var -0.078 -0.058  -0.132*** -0.057  -0.086* -0.082 
 (-0.96) (-0.87)  (-3.34) (-0.98)  (-1.90) (-1.26) 
Link -0.018** -0.021***  -0.025*** -0.022***  -0.011 -0.023*** 
 (-2.15) (-3.88)  (-3.77) (-4.66)  (-1.12) (-4.36) 
Link*C_Var 0.214*** 0.112**  0.288*** 0.116***  0.138** 0.099** 
 (3.96) (2.03)  (7.01) (3.23)  (2.28) (2.08) 
MKT_Var 0.072 0.093  -0.323 -0.064  -0.591 -0.057 
 (0.30) (0.52)  (-0.90) (-0.47)  (-1.45) (-0.35) 
IND_Var 1.517*** 1.272***  1.461*** 1.263***  1.351*** 1.159*** 
 (8.03) (6.40)  (6.25) (5.28)  (5.41) (5.19) 
Constant -0.003 -0.013  0.043 0.007 
 0.067** 0.021 
 (-0.12) (-1.00)  (1.38) (0.55) 
 (2.17) (1.51) 
Number of observations 13,300 11,103   12,130 10,220   9,310 7,973 
Adjusted R2 0.215 0.140  0.204 0.145 
 0.184 0.137 
Industry Clustered Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
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Table VII  
Firm Characteristics Determinants of Comovement 
This table investigates the determinants of CSL comovement. The dependent variable is the direct comovement between supplier and customer firms 
during the linked period. Industry comovement is the comovement between supplier and customer’s industries, defined by Fama and French 48 
industry classifications. Institutional ownership overlap is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if customer and supplier firms see more than one 
common institutional investor, and 0 otherwise. Link duration is the natural log of the link duration in months. Size is the natural log of firm’s market 
capitalizations. Sales concentration is CS sales divided by the revenue of either supplier or customer firm. Payable is accounts payable to revenue 
ratio. Receivable is accounts receivable to revenue ratio. Leverage is total debt scaled by firm’s total assets. Market to book ratio is market value of 
the total assets divided by book value of firm’s total assets. ROE is net income scaled by market value of the equity. Size difference is supplier’s size 
scaled by customer’s size. All independent variables are averaged over the duration of the linked period. This sample includes common stocks listed 
at NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX, with prices no less than $5. Utility firms, financial institutions, and ADRs are excluded. Sample period spans from 
1980 to 2015. T-stats are presented in parentheses and year fixed effect are applied to all regressions. 
  Panel A: Full Sample   Panel B: Long-term Links 
Model 1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
Industry Comovement 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.136*** 0.134***  0.293*** 0.244*** 0.277*** 0.253*** 
 (8.32) (6.96) (8.67) (9.49)  (11.50) (8.65) (10.04) (9.92) 
Inst. Ownership Overlap 0.040*** 0.009 0.024* 0.059***  0.039*** 0.003 0.013 0.049*** 
 (3.46) (0.69) (1.76) (4.98)  (2.65) (0.19) (0.84) (3.38) 
Link Duration 0.014*** 0.013** 0.007 0.019***  0.028** 0.017 0.006 0.065*** 
 (2.76) (2.43) (1.19) (3.73)  (2.07) (1.11) (0.37) (4.77) 
C_sales concentration 0.988***  0.537**   1.483***  0.958*  
 (4.76)  (2.15)   (3.39)  (1.86)  
C_payable 0.242***  0.251*** 0.202**  0.146  0.231* 0.183 
 (2.97)  (2.58) (2.30)  (1.28)  (1.84) (1.58) 
C_size 0.034***  0.029***   0.040***  0.034***  
 (13.58)  (9.55)   (11.32)  (8.85)  
C_leverage -0.190***  -0.210*** -0.159***  -0.199***  -0.238*** -0.211*** 
 (-7.15)  (-6.80) (-5.66)  (-5.10)  (-5.54) (-5.46) 
C_mb 0.008**  0.010** 0.011***  -0.007  -0.004 -0.005 
 (2.37)  (2.51) (3.14)  (-1.04)  (-0.55) (-0.83) 
C_roe -0.039**  -0.046** -0.009  -0.028  -0.019 0.052** 
 (-2.00)  (-2.05) (-0.45)  (-1.14)  (-0.74) (2.36) 
S_sales concentration  0.078** -0.007    -0.001 -0.057  
  (1.98) (-0.16)    (-0.02) (-1.07)  
S_receivable  0.066** 0.070** 0.090***   0.166*** 0.109** 0.107*** 
  (2.33) (2.30) (3.35)   (3.31) (2.21) (2.60) 
S_size  0.034*** 0.029***    0.025*** 0.021***  
  (13.98) (11.02)    (8.71) (7.10)  
S_leverage  -0.012 0.015 0.043**   0.037 0.060** 0.099*** 
  (-0.67) (0.80) (2.51)   (1.41) (2.28) (4.13) 
S_mb  0.002 0.002 0.001   0.009*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 
  (1.38) (1.48) (0.53)   (2.60) (3.07) (2.61) 
S_roe  -0.032*** -0.041*** -0.019**   -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.041*** 
  (-3.95) (-4.72) (-2.40)   (-5.75) (-5.75) (-4.24) 
Size difference    -0.025***     -0.027*** 
    (-4.62)     (-3.12) 
Constant -0.122*** -0.024 -0.260*** 0.191***  -0.369*** -0.138* -0.380*** -0.098 
 (-2.96) (-0.72) (-5.13) (5.76)  (-4.58) (-1.74) (-4.25) (-1.32) 
          
Observations 5,321 3,816 3,297 4,409  2,222 1,868 1,748 2,210 
Adjusted R2 0.064 0.068 0.125 0.051  0.128 0.110 0.188 0.095 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 42 
 
 
Table VIII 
One-way Sorted Customer Betas 
This table presents one-way sort portfolios based on customer betas (betas of aggregated customer idiosyncratic returns). Customer idiosyncratic 
returns are the residuals backed out from a customer firm’s monthly excess return using a model controlling for Fama and French 3 factors (MKTRF, 
SMB, and HML) in addition to its corresponding value weighted industry mean returns. We group the customer betas into 6 groups by the number of 
customers of each supplier firm. Group 1-5 are supplier firms with 1-5 customer firms, respectively. Group 6 hosts supplier firms with more than 5 
customer firms. Customer betas are estimated in the first step of Fama-Macbeth methodology using 36-month rolling windows. This first step regress 
supplier firms’ returns on aggregated customer idiosyncratic returns, as well as Fama and French three factors. Both equal-weighted and value-
weighted customer betas are shown in the table. The sample includes common stocks listed at NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. Utility firms, financial 
institutions, microcap stocks (stock prices lower than $5), and ADRs are excluded.  
Group: Number of Customers Customer Beta EW Customer Beta VW 
1 24.1*** 1.23 
 (13.6) (0.74) 
2 49.12*** 17.09*** 
 (17.41) (4.93) 
3 26.21*** 20.23*** 
 (7.95) (4.92) 
4 48.24*** 54.87*** 
 (8.17) (11.54) 
5 101.76*** 86.57*** 
 (6.6) (5.49) 
6 105.02*** 120.93*** 
  (9.61) (10.5) 
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Table IX 
Customer Risk Factor 
This table includes the test results on whether the customer factor is priced in supplier’s stock returns. Customer factor is monthly 
aggregated idiosyncratic returns of all customers in our sample. Idiosyncratic returns are the residuals backed out from a firm’s 
monthly excess return using a model controlling for Fama and French 3 factors (MKTRF, SMB, and HML) in addition to its 
corresponding value weighted industry mean returns. Peripheral customers are customer firms with less than 3 suppliers in our 
sample. Size is a firm’s market capitalization in the previous month. BM is calculated as current fiscal year’s book equity to the 
firm’s market equity in June. All stock returns are matched with BM from previous fiscal year. The regressions also controls for 
lag monthly (lag(RET)) and annual returns (Lag(RET_1Year)). The regressions follow Fama-Macbeth methodology. Betas of 
each independent variable are first estimated using the 36-month rolling window in the first step. The second step runs cross-
sectional regression of supplier returns on each as well as all betas in the months immediately following the rolling windows. The 
sample includes common stocks listed at NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. Utility firms, financial institutions, microcap stocks 
(stock prices lower than $5), and ADRs are excluded.  
Customer Factor 0.0616***           0.0507*** 
 (3.19) 
     (2.77) 
Peripheral Customers Idiosyncratic Returns   -0.314    0.0853 
 
  (-0.82)    (1.53) 
Market Idiosyncratic Returns     0.0170  0.0237 
 
    (0.75)  (1.09) 
 
       
MKTRF -0.126  0.0790  -0.112  -0.132 
 (-0.80) 
 (0.32)  (-0.71)  (-0.85) 
Log(Size) -0.114***  0.0349  -0.0933***  -0.124*** 
 (-3.45) 
 (0.24)  (-2.69)  (-3.63) 
BM 0.250  2.320  0.268  0.0826* 
 (1.49) 
 (1.04)  (1.53)  (1.82) 
Lag(RET) -3.430***  -1.500  -3.760***  -3.910*** 
 (-5.74) 
 (-0.64)  (-6.64)  (-6.87) 
Lag(RET_1Year) 0.459*  1.420  0.390**  0.362** 
  (1.96)   (1.25)   (2.00)   (2.01) 
Constant 1.410***   -1.030   1.210***   1.570*** 
 (4.04) 
 (-0.41)  (3.14)  (4.49) 
Number of Observations 180960   180960   180960   180960 
Adjusted R2 0.072   0.072   0.072   0.083 
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Table X 
Long-short Portfolio 
We construct a long-short portfolio to profit from customer-supplier network risk propagation. This table presents the excess 
returns from our long-short portfolio strategy. Supplier firms are first sorted into quintiles based on their customer betas: 1 being 
the lowest customer beta group and 5 being the highest beta group. The dependent variable of the long-short portfolio is the 
differences in supplier returns between group 5 and group 1. RetEW and RetVW are simply the equal-weighted and value-
weighted stock returns of the supplier firms in each quintile. We employ Fama and French 4-factor model to evaluate the risk 
compensation. AlphaEW and AlphaVW are intercepts from regressions of equal-weighted and value-weighted supplier returns 
on the 4 factors (MKTRF, SMB, HML, and UMD). The sample includes common stocks listed at NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. 
Utility firms, financial institutions, microcap stocks (stock prices lower than $5), and ADRs are excluded. 
Customer Beta Quintiles RetEW RetVW AlphaEW AlphaVW 
1 1.23*** 0.83*** 0.21** -0.14 
 (3.91) (2.65) (2.08) (-0.9) 
2 1.24*** 0.96*** 0.18** 0.07 
 (4.9) (4.36) (2.21) (0.65) 
3 1.26*** 0.91*** 0.23*** 0.05 
 (5.09) (4.07) (3.38) (0.48) 
4 1.39*** 0.98*** 0.35*** 0.16 
 (5.18) (3.34) (4.33) (1.07) 
5 1.51*** 1.3*** 0.47*** 0.37** 
 (4.55) (3.75) (4.31) (2.17) 
Long-Short Portfolio 0.28** 0.47** 0.26* 0.51** 
 (2.18) (2.17) (1.95) (2.28) 
Annualized Alpha 3.34** 5.68** 3.1* 6.11** 
  (2.18) (2.17) (1.95) (2.28) 
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Abstract 
This paper investigates the economic outcomes of corporate espionage (also known as 
trade secrets) lawsuits. Utilizing 137 hand-collected trade secret cases, we find significantly 
positive (negative) abnormal returns for the favorable (unfavorable) court decisions up to 5 days 
around the court decision dates. Our findings are consistent with two hypotheses: information 
leaking before the event and investor overreaction/underreaction on and after the event days. Our 
analysis on firm fundamentals show that the consequences of losing trade secret lawsuits are 
long-lasting. The findings indicate that the punishment incorporated by the market is more severe 
for the losing firms.  
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Introduction 
The stock market is susceptible to companies’ involvement in legal confronts. Corporate 
litigations are expensive, and affect a firm’s stock market performance as well as corporate 
decisions. Karpoff et al.  (2008a) show that a firm’s reputational damage from financial 
misrepresentation can be 7.5 times as large as the nominal penalty from the law enforcement 
order. Moreover, the managers personally must pay the price for cooking the book (Karpoff et al. 
2008b). Extensive studies have focused on the consequences of firms’ malpractice, which is 
against public interests (Becker, 1968; Alexander, 1999; Karpoff et al. 2008a, 2008b; Karpoff et 
al. 2005; Karpoff et al. 2014). Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to the economic 
outcomes of legal battles over sensitive corporate issues, such as corporate espionage, between 
companies. Corporate espionage, emerged from intense market competition and intended to steal 
the trade secrets from competing firms, implies lucrative opportunities and dramatic conflicts of 
interests (Fink, 2003; Fitzpatrick, 2003; Fitzpatrick et al., 2004). The resolutions of such 
corporate espionage cases have important economic implications.  
In this paper, we seek to fill this gap by examining the financial outcomes of firms 
embattled in corporate trade secret lawsuits. Corporate espionage activities are widely studied in 
legal and ethical areas (Boni, 1999; Maher and Thompson, 2002; Almeling et al., 2009, 2010), 
but little has been explored on the business side. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to supplement 
the trade secret research with insights from the financial market.  
Using hand-collected trade secret lawsuits from the LexisNexis database for the period of 
1992 to 2012, we find that when a court decision is favorable (unfavorable) to a firm, the firm’s 
market-adjusted returns are significantly positive (negative). The abnormal returns last for a five-
day event window (-2, 2). The results shed lights on the trading behavior of investors. Anecdotal 
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evidence shows that active investors attempt to dig the leaking information and trade 
accordingly. Moreover, Eastwood and Nutt (1999) and Chan (2003) show that investors 
overreact to good news and underreact to bad news. The empirical evidence we document 
supports both information leaking and investor overreaction/underreaction hypotheses. We 
further show that the impacts of the trade secret lawsuits are long-lasting, especially for firms 
losing the case.  The evidence indicates that the punishment borne by the market is more 
substantial for firms losing the litigations. 
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, our study contributes to the 
legal research in the financial market. Karpoff et al. (2008a, 2008b) show that the costs of firms 
cooking the books are enormous, including reputational loss and direct penalty. We provide 
evidence on the economic consequences of trade secret lawsuits. We add to the literature by 
analyzing how the court decisions of legal combats over corporate trade secret activities affect 
investors’ expectation of the firms in the short run.  
Second, our work also contributes to documenting how the court decisions influence a 
firm’s corporate activities in the long run. Gurun and Kominers (2014) show that intellectual 
rights lawsuits, such as patent trolls, discourage future innovation activities of the target firms. 
We add to the literature by showing that this discouragement is not only for patent troll cases. In 
addition, we find that firms losing the trade secret cases tend to be more conservative in their 
corporate activities with fewer intangible assets, lower capital expenditures, and less use of debt.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data and methodology. Section 
3 presents the empirical results of the event study. Section 4 illustrates the implications for 
corporate policies. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
Data and Methodology 
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The data used in this paper is composed of hand-collected trade secret cases from 
LexisNexis Academic. Cases in our sample generally go through at least two court trials before 
they conclude. Since our paper investigates the economic outcomes, we exclude cases with no 
public firms involved. Our initial sample consists of 213 cases for the period of 1992 to 2012. 
The 213 cases cover 569 trials.  We collect a set of information for each trial including names, 
GVKEYs, and CUSIPs of both plaintiff and defendant companies. We then match the firms with 
the data in CRSP and Compustat. For each trial in each case, we also identify the favorability of 
the court rulings to both parties. There are trials deemed as non-material, which are thus 
excluded in later analysis. Reasons to classify the non-material cases are summarized in detail in 
Appendix Table A1.  
Table 1 presents the summary of the cases collected. One lawsuit case goes through 
roughly five trials before it concludes. Most cases conclude after two trials. After excluding trials 
with non-material court decisions and those without available return data, our final sample is 
composed of 137 cases that cover 312 trials. 
All trials in the final sample are categorized into two groups: 1) plaintiff group, which are 
in pursuit of recovering their damages actively; 2) defendant group, which fights to secure their 
benefits. The trials in each group are further assigned to three categories based on court 
decisions: favorable, unfavorable, or non-material. As shown in Table 1, we identify 57 trials 
that favor plaintiffs, 68 favor defendants, 31 against plaintiffs, 58 against defendants, and 98 
non-material decisions. This hand-collected dataset allows us to observe the stock market 
reactions to material court decisions from one side of the lawsuits because either the return data 
for the other side is not available or the other side is not a public company.  
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We follow Karpoff et al. (2009) and conduct an event study on the market reaction to 
trade secret lawsuit decisions. Abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model during 
short-term event windows around material decision announcement dates. We compute the 
cumulative raw returns (CRET) and the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) on the event day 
(0), one (-1, 1), and two trading days (-2, 2) around the decision announcement dates.  
Empirical Results 
Prior studies document significantly positive returns around good news events, such as 
earnings announcements and earnings surprises (La Porta et al., 1986; DeFond et al., 2007). 
Thus, we expect to observe positive price reaction to favorable court decisions. On the other 
hand, when they receive unfavorable court rulings, firms are expected to experience negative 
stock price movement (Karpoff et al., 2008). In addition, firms experience reputation loss when 
they have product recalls (Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985), defense procurement fraud (Karpoff et 
al., 1999), and environmental violations (Karpoff, et al., 2005).  
Table 2 reports the stock market reaction around the court decision dates in our sample. 
We form six categories: Plaintiffs (Favorable), Plaintiffs (Unfavorable), Defendants (Favorable), 
Defendants (Unfavorable), Plaintiffs (Non-material), and Defendants (Non-material). As 
reported in Panel A of Table 2, the mean CAR ranges from -1.739% to 2.284% for the six 
categories. When plaintiffs receive favorable court decisions, 85.96% out of the 57 firms 
experience positive abnormal returns. In the case of Plaintiffs (Favorable), the average CAR is 
2.284% with a Patell’s t value of 4.30. Similarly, when the court decisions for defendants are 
favorable, the abnormal returns are also significantly positive (2.171%). Both results are 
consistent with prior studies and our predictions that firms benefit from favorable court rulings, 
resulting in positive stock market reaction. In contrast, the mean event day CAR is significantly 
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negative when court rulings are unfavorable for both plaintiffs and defendants with values of -
1.365% and -1.739%, respectively. Unfavorable decisions discourage investors’ confidence, 
which further reduces a firm’s market valuation. The mean CAR is marginally significant and 
negative when defendants receive non-material court decisions. We also extend the event 
windows to (-1, 1) and (-2, 2), as reported in Panel B and Panel C of Table 2. The abnormal 
returns are spanned over a longer window than those of the decision announcement dates. The 
findings are consistent with the results for the event day (0) abnormal returns. 
Investors, especially institutional investors and insiders, have the incentive, motivation, 
and resources to obtain and process information (Brunnermeier, 2005). Thus, investors might 
trade on the private information before the court decisions are announced, leading to significant 
turbulence in stock prices before the decision dates. On the other hand, investors may overreact 
or underreact to the court decisions (Bondt et al., 1987). As a result, the significant cumulative 
abnormal returns over the longer event windows can also be a result of investors’ irrational 
trading activities. To disentangle the two types of trades, we test abnormal stock returns for the 
following two event windows: (-2, -1) and (1, 2). The results are reported in Table 3. As shown 
in Panel A, before the decisions are announced, the mean CAR is significantly positive with a 
value of 1.508% for Plaintiffs (Favorable). Whereas, the pre-event average CAR is -1.964% (t-
value=-2.55) when the outcomes are unfavorable for plaintiffs. We do not observe significant 
results for defendants. The findings are not surprising since plaintiff firms are actively seeking 
resolutions while defendants are holding ground.  A more interesting implication of such results 
is that they are in line with information leaking hypothesis. In order to fully illustrate this point 
of view, we need to combine the results in both panel A and panel B of Table 3.  
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Panel B of Table 3 presents the results for post-event abnormal returns. In the cases of 
Plaintiffs (Favorable), we do not observe significant market reaction after the event day. One 
explanation is that the information content of the decisions on plaintiffs has been substantially 
explored by investors and incorporated into stock prices before and on the decision 
announcement dates. In comparison, the defendant favorable group shows no evidence of 
significant CAR before the decision announcement dates due to investors holding around. 
However, the mean CAR is 0.391% and significant for Defendants (Favorable) during the post- 
event window of (1, 2). Investors do not discriminate against defendant firms when they intend 
to profit from private information. Information leaking hypothesis solely is far from enough to 
fully explain the differences in CAR between plaintiff and defendant group, as well as the 
differences in CAR between pre and post-event windows for both groups. The findings suggest 
that investors also overreact to good news while they are digging for private information. For 
both unfavorable decision groups, there is no significant market reaction after the decision dates. 
The combined results are consistent with Eastwood and Nutt (1999) and Chan (2003), which 
conclude that investors overreact to good news and underreact to bad news. In summary, the 
evidence also supports the investors’ irrational reaction hypothesis.  
Long-term Corporate Decisions 
Extensive studies have documented the consequences when firms are charged with 
misconduct. In addition to the legal penalties that firms are responsible for (Karpoff et al., 2008a; 
Karpoff et al., 2005), reputational losses are even more substantial (Karpoff et al., 2008b). 
Similarly, firms will also have to face loss in their future investment and growth opportunities 
(Karpoff et al., 2013). Essentially, the punishments to firms would be imposed more by the 
market in the long run.  
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We next examine the long-term effects of the trade secret lawsuits. We employ a 
difference-in-difference multivariate regression analysis for a ten-year event window (Event year 
-5 to Event year -1, and Event year +1 to Event year +5). For each firm in the sample, the 
industry average of the same event year is constructed as the control group. The variable Lawsuit 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is in our sample, and 0 if it is the industry 
average. Post is an indicator with the value of 1 for the post-lawsuit fiscal year and 0 otherwise. 
The interaction of these two indicators is also introduced to compare the different effects of the 
lawsuits before and after the decision announcement dates. The description of each variable is 
summarized in Appendix Table A2. Panel A of Table 4 shows that firms receiving favorable 
court decisions do not seem to obtain many benefits in the long run, except for higher cash 
holdings. Nevertheless, with respect to unfavorable outcomes in Panel B of Table 4, the 
consequences seem to be more long-lasting. Specifically, firms receiving unfavorable court 
decisions conduct fewer R&D activities, spend less on capital expenditures, lose more intangible 
assets, and hold less cash. In addition, these firms also become more conservative in weighing 
debts after the lawsuits. The lower leverage used by firms losing the lawsuits can be due to 
precautionary reasons because the actual economic outcomes of the loss are uncertain until they 
eventually realize the loss. It is also likely that the reputation loss gives them less access to debt 
financing. In addition, these firms continue to have a lower-than-before market-to-book ratio 
after the lawsuit. In Appendix Table A3, we also compare the industry-adjusted firm 
fundamentals the year before and after the decision announcement dates. It seems that firms with 
favorable outcomes improve their fundamentals immediately after the court decisions. In 
summary, while firms winning the cases seem to benefit from the lawsuits, most of the positive 
effects are temporary. In comparison, firms with unfavorable court announcements suffer more 
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from the legal events in the longer term. As an extension of prior studies, the results imply that 
the punishment borne by the market is more substantial for firms losing the litigations. 
Conclusion 
This paper studies how a firm’s involvement in a trade secret lawsuit and the following 
court decision favorability affect the firm’s market valuation and corporate policies. Using 137 
trade secret cases with 312 trials, we find that stock prices of firms respond to favorable 
(unfavorable) court decisions with positive (negative) abnormal returns during a five-day 
window (-2, 2) relative to the court decision announcement dates. The abnormal returns around 
the event days are consistent with the investors trading behavior that they dig information 
leaking and overreact/underreact to good/bad news. We further find that the effects from the 
trade secret court decisions can be long-lasting, especially for firms losing the cases during the 
process. Overall, our studies indicate that the market is incline to punish firms that lose the 
litigations in the long run instead of rewarding winning ones.  
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for 213 trade secret cases in which at least one public 
company is involved. Cases cover the period of 1992 to 2012. Case data is hand collected from 
LexisNexis database, and companies present in the trials are merged with CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT database. The whole sample is divided into plaintiffs group and defendants 
group. Each group contains three subsets based on the court decisions.  
 
All Cases with Public Firms  
Number of Cases     213     
 Mean Median Mode Max Min 
Number of Trials within a Case 4.83 3 2 34 2 
Final Sample (Trials with Return Data Available) 
Number of Cases  137 
Number of Trials  312 
Court Decisions Obs. for Each Decision Group 
Favorable to Plaintiffs   57     
Unfavorable to Plaintiffs   31 
  
Favorable to Defendants   68 
  
Unfavorable to Defendants   58 
  
Non-material Trials from Plaintiffs Group   57 
  
Non-material Trials from Defendants Group     41     
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Table 2 Stock Market Reaction around Decision Dates 
 
This table reports the stock market reaction around the decision dates for the 6 decision groups 
during the period of 1992 to 2012. The event windows include Event Day (0), (-1, 1), and (-2, 2). 
The stock market reaction is measured using cumulative raw returns (CRET) and cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) over the event windows. We estimate beta by regressing a firm’s daily 
stock returns on the market returns over the 5-year period ending on the trading day before the 
event window. The estimated beta is then used to calculate the stock predicted returns during the 
event windows. We measure abnormal returns as the difference between actual stock returns and 
the predicted returns. The table presents the number of observations (N), the average of 
cumulative raw returns (Mean CRET), the average of cumulative abnormal returns (Mean CAR), 
the median of cumulative abnormal returns (Median CAR), the percentage of positive abnormal 
returns, and Patell's t value.  
 
Panel A: Event Day (0) Abnormal Returns 
Court Decisions N Mean CRET Mean CAR Median CAR % of +AR Patell's t 
Plaintiffs (Favorable) 57 2.021% 2.284% 1.133% 85.96% 4.30 
Plaintiffs (Unfavorable) 31 -1.160% -1.365% -0.736% 32.26% -2.13 
Defendants (Favorable) 68 2.464% 2.171% 1.166% 82.35% 6.12 
Defendants (Unfavorable) 58 -1.618% -1.739% -0.917% 17.24% -3.70 
Plaintiffs (Non-material) 57 0.808% 0.627% -0.142% 40.35% 1.58 
Defendants (Non-material) 41 -0.700% -0.591% -0.470% 34.15% -1.73 
Panel B: Event Window (-1, 1) Abnormal Returns 
Court Decisions N Mean CRET Mean CAR Median CAR % of +AR Patell's t 
Plaintiffs (Favorable) 57 3.500% 3.568% 1.858% 71.93% 4.30 
Plaintiffs (Unfavorable) 31 -1.823% -2.029% -2.149% 32.26% -2.27 
Defendants (Favorable) 68 3.221% 2.766% 1.517% 75.00% 6.18 
Defendants (Unfavorable) 58 -2.475% -2.675% -1.090% 31.03% -3.00 
Plaintiffs (Non-material) 57 1.383% 1.096% -0.144% 49.12% 1.71 
Defendants (Non-material) 41 0.131% -0.361% -0.848% 26.83% -1.38 
Panel C: Event Window (-2, 2) Abnormal Returns 
Court Decisions N Mean CRET Mean CAR Median CAR % of +AR Patell's t 
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Plaintiffs (Favorable) 57 4.058% 4.306% 2.489% 68.42% 3.93 
Plaintiffs (Unfavorable) 31 -2.455% -2.477% -2.716% 32.26% -1.85 
Defendants (Favorable) 68 3.096% 2.872% 1.463% 64.71% 4.53 
Defendants (Unfavorable) 58 -1.820% -1.854% -1.167% 34.48% -1.83 
Plaintiffs (Non-material) 57 2.110% 1.834% 0.516% 56.14% 2.18 
Defendants (Non-material) 41 0.998% 0.306% 0.172% 53.66% -0.28 
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Table 3 Pre- and Post- Decision Announcement Dates Abnormal Returns 
 
This table reports the stock market reaction around the decision dates for the 6 decision groups 
during the period of 1992 to 2012. The event windows include (-2,-1) and (1,2). The stock 
market reaction is measured using cumulative raw returns (CRET) and cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) over the event windows. We estimate  beta by regressing a firm’s daily stock 
returns on the market returns over the 5-year period ending on the trading day before the event 
window. The estimated beta is then used to calculate the stock predicted returns during the event 
window. We measure abnormal returns as the difference between actual stock returns and the 
predicted returns. The table presents the number of observations (N), the average of cumulative 
raw returns (Mean CRET), the average of cumulative abnormal returns (Mean CAR), the median 
of cumulative abnormal returns (Median CAR), the percentage of positive abnormal returns, and 
Patell's t value.  
 
Panel A: Event Window (-2, -1) Abnormal Returns 
Court Decisions N Mean CRET Mean CAR Median CAR % of +AR Patell's t 
Plaintiffs (Favorable) 57 1.310% 1.508% 0.971% 63.16% 2.38 
Plaintiffs (Unfavorable) 31 -1.982% -1.964% -1.515% 16.13% -2.55 
Defendants (Favorable) 68 0.205% 0.304% 0.126% 57.35% 0.40 
Defendants (Unfavorable) 58 0.160% -0.045% -0.276% 41.38% -0.11 
Plaintiffs (Non-material) 57 1.031% 0.797% -0.018% 49.12% 1.95 
Defendants (Non-material) 41 0.270% 0.040% -0.378% 39.02% -0.38 
Panel B: Event Window (1, 2) Abnormal Returns 
Court Decisions N Mean CRET Mean CAR Median CAR % of +AR Patell's t 
Plaintiffs (Favorable) 57 0.536% 0.486% 0.284% 56.14% 0.75 
Plaintiffs (Unfavorable) 31 0.657% 0.899% 0.215% 51.61% 1.17 
Defendants (Favorable) 68 0.456% 0.391% -0.041% 48.53% 2.41 
Defendants (Unfavorable) 58 -0.334% -0.067% -0.455% 43.10% -0.16 
Plaintiffs (Non-material) 57 0.369% 0.398% -0.078% 49.12% 0.37 
Defendants (Non-material) 41 1.450% 0.853% 0.732% 58.54% 1.16 
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Table 4 Difference-in-Difference Regression Analysis 
This table reports the difference-in-difference regression analysis for a ten-year event window 
(Event year -5 to Event year -1, and Event year +1 to Event year +5). For each firm in the 
sample, the industry average of the same event year is constructed and included as a control 
group. The variable Lawsuit is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm is in our sample, 
and 0 if it is the industry average. Post is an indicator with the value 1 for the post-lawsuit fiscal 
year and 0 otherwise. The definitions of all other variables are described in Appendix Table A2. 
We control for the year and industry fixed effects. t-values are reported in parentheses. Statistical 
significance is denoted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Favorable Firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable R&D CAPEX Intangible Q Cash Debt 
Lawsuit -0.123*** -0.068*** -0.091*** -20.728*** -0.368*** 0.009 
 
(-6.91) (-6.15) (-2.88) (-7.10) (-7.97) (1.08) 
Post -0.021 -0.01 -0.039 -7.587** -0.142** 0.011 
 
(-0.91) (-0.71) (-0.96) (-1.99) (-2.32) (1.04) 
Lawsuit*Post 0.026 0.007 0.031 2.928 0.158** 0.002 
 
(1.02) (0.42) (0.69) (0.71) (2.42) (0.18) 
Obs. 867 1,141 1,170 1,151 1,205 1,447 
R-squared 0.131 0.119 0.039 0.11 0.111 0.023 
Panel B: Unfavorable Firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable R&D CAPEX Intangible Q Cash Debt 
Lawsuit -0.097*** -0.041* -0.063 -12.244*** -0.358*** -0.181** 
 
(-3.49) (-1.78) (-1.11) (-3.42) (-4.11) (-2.55) 
Post 0.109*** 0.157*** 0.178** 5.282 0.136 0.204** 
 
(3.16) (5.09) (2.36) (1.12) (1.15) (2.13) 
Lawsuit*Post -0.131*** -0.108*** -0.221*** -18.750*** -0.204* -0.175* 
 
(-3.49) (-3.35) (-2.81) (-3.78) (-1.68) (-1.77) 
Obs. 726 894 901 885 945 947 
R-squared 0.161 0.15 0.102 0.158 0.115 0.067 
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Appendix (Essay 1) 
Centrality 
This table adds one additional control variable to Table IX: eigenvector centrality of the supplier firms in the customer-supplier 
network. Eigenvector centrality is the first eigenvector of the customer-supplier network’s adjacency matrix. We form the 
customer-supplier network matrix using sales number. Customer factor is monthly aggregated idiosyncratic returns of all 
customers in our sample. Idiosyncratic returns are the residuals backed out from a firm’s monthly excess return using a model 
controlling for Fama and French 3 factors (MKTRF, SMB, and HML) in addition to its corresponding value weighted industry 
mean returns. Peripheral customers are customer firms with less than 3 suppliers in our sample. Size is a firm’s market 
capitalization in the previous month. BM is calculated as current fiscal year’s book equity to the firm’s market equity in June. All 
stock returns are matched with BM from previous fiscal year. The regressions also controls for lag monthly (lag(RET)) and 
annual returns (Lag(RET_1Year)). The regressions follow Fama-Macbeth methodology. Betas of each independent variable are 
first estimated using the 36-month rolling window in the first step. The second step runs cross-sectional regression of supplier 
returns on each as well as all betas in the months immediately following the rolling windows. The sample includes common 
stocks listed at NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. Utility firms, financial institutions, microcap stocks (stock prices lower than $5), 
and ADRs are excluded. 
Customer Factor 0.0563***           0.0515*** 
 (3.02) 
     (2.70) 
Peripheral Customers Idiosyncratic Returns   0.0893    0.0690 
 
  (1.65)    (1.32) 
Market Idiosyncratic Returns     0.0117  0.0215 
 
    (0.51)  (0.95) 
Centrality 2.780  2.330  2.500  2.380 
 (1.31) 
 (1.12)  (1.18)  (1.16) 
MKTRF -0.0707  -0.0968  -0.0880  -0.109 
 (-0.46) 
 (-0.62)  (-0.58)  (-0.73) 
Log(Size) -0.0719*  -0.0931**  -0.0645*  -0.0958*** 
 (-1.92) 
 (-2.58)  (-1.71)  (-2.67) 
BM 0.335*  0.161***  0.335*  0.144** 
 (1.75) 
 (2.60)  (1.81)  (2.39) 
Lag(RET) -4.100***  -4.190***  -4.210***  -4.430*** 
 (-7.04) 
 (-7.14)  (-7.24)  (-7.41) 
Lag(RET_1Year) 0.355*  0.282  0.355*  0.319* 
  (1.76)   (1.48)   (1.81)   (1.72) 
Constant 0.941**   1.200***   0.880**   1.240*** 
 (2.30) 
 (3.25)  (2.12)  (3.46) 
Number of Obs. 143980   143980   143980   143980 
Adjusted R2 0.085   0.085   0.085   0.099 
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Appendix (Essay 2) Table A1 Summary Statistics for Non-material Trials 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for non-material trials. Case data is hand collected 
from LexisNexis database. Court decisions are categorized into three categories for both 
plaintiffs and defendants groups: favorable, unfavorable, and non-material. Cases cover the 
period of 1992 to 2012. Reasons and the number of non-material trials are presented. 
 
Reasons for Non-Material Decisions Obs 
Motion to seal opinions 3 
Appeal court affirmed previous decisions 11 
Motive to gain access to sealed documents 5 
Bankruptcy cases 8 
Neutral statements 33 
Fought over legal expenses less than $100,000 6 
Court requested for more information 14 
Motions were brought up by non-party 4 
Motion to consolidate 4 
Motion to compel arbitration 10 
Total 98 
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Appendix (Essay 2) Table A2 Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition Data Source 
R&D  XRD/AT Compustat 
Capital  CAPX/AT Compustat 
Debt (DLTT+DLC)/AT Compustat 
Intangible INTAN/AT Compustat 
Cash CH/AT Compustat 
Q (AT+PRCC_F*CSHO-CEQ)/AT Compustat 
      
 
Appendix (Essay 2) Table A3 Short-term Difference in Firm Characteristics between 
Sample and Industry 
This table reports the univariate results of a firm’s industry-adjusted fundamentals the fiscal year 
before and after the lawsuit court decision announcement dates. The industry that a firm belongs 
to is identified using the four-digit SIC code. The definitions of all the variables are described in 
Appendix Table A2. We calculate a firm’s industry-adjusted fundamentals by comparing a 
firm’s fundamentals with firms within the same industry during the same fiscal year. We then 
take the average of each variable across the sample.  For each variable, t-values are reported for 
both pre- and post- announcement groups. Besides, t-values for the difference between the pre- 
and post-event windows are also reported. Panel A and Panel B report the univariate results for 
firms with favorable court decisions and unfavorable court decisions, respectively. 
Panel A: Firms with Favorable Outcomes 
Variables Observation Year Mean Median Std t-value t-value (Post-Pre) 
R&D  
Pre-announcement -0.1317 -0.0038 0.4765 -11.52 
3.89 
Post-announcement -0.0750 0.0000 0.3607 -8.35 
CAPEX 
Pre-announcement -0.0534 0.0120 0.3132 -10.03 
4.89 
Post-announcement -0.0212 0.0033 0.1544 -7.10 
Debt 
Pre-announcement -0.1737 0.0000 0.7409 -12.00 
4.56 
Post-announcement -0.0863 0.0000 0.6211 -6.93 
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Intangible  
Pre-announcement -0.0451 0.0022 0.5439 -4.49 
4.19 
Post-announcement 0.0123 0.0086 0.4009 1.45 
Cash 
Pre-announcement -0.3742 -0.0179 1.5926 -14.15 
3.89 
Post-announcement -0.2504 -0.0326 0.9529 -14.12 
Q 
Pre-announcement -8.8685 0.1920 51.8485 -9.61 
1.01 
Post-announcement -7.5636 0.2956 44.8469 -8.36 
Panel B: Firms with Unfavorable Outcomes 
Variables Observation Year Mean Median Std t-value t-value (Post-Pre) 
R&D  
Pre-announcement -0.1410 -0.0067 0.5504 -11.90 
0.09 
Post-announcement -0.1394 0.0079 0.6238 -10.62 
CAPEX 
Pre-announcement -0.0427 -0.0044 0.2892 -8.33 
-5.09 
Post-announcement -0.0802 -0.0096 0.3018 -15.11 
Debt 
Pre-announcement -0.1256 0.0000 0.6414 -9.68 
0.23 
Post-announcement -0.1212 0.0000 0.7160 -9.04 
Intangible  
Pre-announcement -0.0103 0.0000 0.7897 -0.70 
-7.08 
Post-announcement -0.1630 0.0000 0.8656 -10.47 
Cash 
Pre-announcement -0.3972 -0.0290 1.8552 -12.18 
-3.56 
Post-announcement -0.6000 -0.0073 2.6891 -13.09 
Q 
Pre-announcement -5.8670 -0.2823 34.9396 -9.06 
-4.31 
Post-announcement -10.8198 0.1117 51.9118 -11.59 
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“Aggregation of Idiosyncratic Shocks in Customer-Supplier Network”  
I investigate the channels of information diffusion along the supply chain after 
documenting strong contemporaneous return comovement between customer and supplier 
firms. Using Cen, Da, and Zhao’s (CDZ, 2013) methodology, I decompose customer’s returns 
into cash flow and discount rate components. The evidence suggests information transmit 
through both channels. Nevertheless, the establishment and revelation of the economic links 
induce additional cash flow news passage, and the aggregated cash flow news drives the 
comovement higher. Further examinations reveal the cash flow channel tunnels firm-specific 
information including earnings, and the trade credits influences flow through discount rate 
channel. The study contributes to both financial information channels research and stock 
return comovement literature. Revealing information channels carries critical messages and 
implications to not only professional investors, but also the whole market. 
 
“Economic Outcomes of Corporate Espionage” 
This study investigates financial outcomes of trade secret lawsuits through stock market 
reactions to court decisions, using hand-collected case data from LexisNexis database. We 
depict the big pictures of the legislative process and examine possible explanations for the 
abnormal returns from information leak and overreaction/underreaction perspectives. The 
firm-level difference-in-differences study suggests the lawsuit outcomes both encourage 
R&D investment and disturb firm’s capital expenditure, communicating implications for 
corporations' employment and investment policies. 
 
“Investing Precautionary Cash Reserve” 
 This paper investigates how quickly and effectively corporations invest the cash 
raised from equity and debt financing for precautionary purposes. Using a cash half-life 
measure, we find it takes firms about 4 to 6 years to invest the cash reserve. Precautionary 
cash reserve raised from both equity and debt financing is used to fund capital expenditure 
and retire existing liabilities. The evidence reveals the rationale and effectiveness of 
manager’s decision to raise precautionary cash reserve. Precautionary cash is raised when 
the market interest rate is lower, or when managers foresee future investment opportunities.  
 
 
